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I. INTRODUCTION

The English trust, transplanted to offshore financial centers,
has found a hot-house environment in which law and practice
have developed swiftly in recent years-too swiftly for some, not
swiftly enough for others. This is the story of a long-established
legal mechanism being employed to meet new requirements and
conditions, and of governments who understand that their
economies depend upon the success of their financial centers. In
England, by contrast, the trust has continued to cater largely to
domestic requirements and, though there has been some change
in these requirements, successive governments have ignored calls
for reform.
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II. IN THE BEGINNING...

TAXATION

I was not present at the birth of the offshore financial centers
or of their trust business, but I am told that the mother was
taxation. Perhaps that is an oversimplification, but I do not
doubt that taxation was the major influence. The typical settlor
was a taxpayer from one of the major common law countries, and
his primary motive for going offshore was tax avoidance. But
there were also a few settlors from other places, some motivated
by estate planning considerations (the trust allowing them to
make property arrangements which could not be made at home),
some by fear or distrust of rulers. With the Second World War

vividly remembered, the Cold War in progress, widespread
exchange controls, and much of the world under socialist,
repressive, or untested regimes, the wealthy man (or corporation)
might understandably seek to invest in the United States or other
"safe" countries, and to hold these investments in a way that
would protect them from any rapacious tendencies on the part of
his own or neighboring governments. In those days, the Swiss
account was the standard answer for fearful individuals, but
some thought Switzerland too close to the Iron Curtain.
Bermuda and the Bahamas had the geographic advantage and
also a flexible legal mechanism by which the client could obtain
continuing protection for his family.
As far as I know, tax considerations did not in any of the
offshore centers lead to a significant change in trust law. One
should not be surprised by that; the trust already had a long
history as a tax-avoidance mechanism. It already provided the
tax planner with the ability to construct practically any propertyholding arrangement of which he could conceive. Of course,
taxation did affect trust practice-and still does-but, as tax
regimes differ and change, the influence has been mostly of a
patchy and transitory nature.
The only pervasive and lasting effect has been the popularity
of the discretionary trust in which the trust instrument defines
the class of beneficiaries and leaves it to the trustee to decide
what, if anything, a beneficiary is to receive, and when. Initially,
this held out substantial tax advantages in many tax regimesbecause the beneficiary had no quantifiable interest. It was not
long before the major common law countries adopted measures to
close off that particular tax-avoidance technique, but by then the
discretionary trust had endeared itself to the institutions that
provide trust services. It was seen as a simple and convenient
instrument, easily adaptable to the client's requirements by

means of a letter of wishes, an informal document in which the
settlor sets out in precatory form his wishes regarding the
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exercise of the trustee's distributive discretions. To those unused
to this practice it may seem a strange way of doing things, but it
certainly provides great flexibility; and that is a highly desirable
feature-unless and until it is penalized by the relevant tax
regime. No settlor can predict the needs and circumstances of
those he wishes to benefit; and there is no reason to suppose that
the next fifty years will see any fewer changes than have occurred
in the last fifty years in relation to investment, taxation, and the
general condition of the world.
On the other hand, the settlor must, of course, be advised
that there will probably be no legal recourse if the trustee
disregards the letter of wishes. Some settlors are reassured that
this is unlikely to occur if a responsible professional trustee has

been chosen and, certainly, most professional trustees are only
too happy to have guidelines. If anything, their tendency is to
give too much regard to the letter of wishes and not enough to
other relevant considerations.
If the settlor requires greater
reassurance, one solution is to provide a watchdog mechanism,
perhaps a protector equipped with a power to replace the
trustee. 2 Another more direct solution, but less common, is to
give some legal effect to the letter of wishes by providing in the
trust deed that the trustee must pay due regard to the letter. The
wording of that clause requires care to achieve the right balance
between flexibility and reassurance, and such clauses are
difficult to standardize (because so much depends on what sort of
wishes the settlor wants to express), which may be why they are
not more common.
Sometimes the discretionary trust with letter of wishes is
used when the settlor is not in fact looking for flexibility and does
not really want the trustee to exercise discretion; in these cases,
the letter of wishes is specific about the distributions that are to
be made, or it calls on the trustee to act on the recommendations
of a specified person. Whatever the reason, and sometimes it is
simply that the settlor does not want to incur the expense of legal
advice, this arrangement is unsatisfactory in several respects, not
least that it raises the question of whether the trust deed is a
sham. Happily, offshore trustees have become more sensitive in
recent years to the question of sham and, indeed, the other
dangers of dealing with settlors who do not have adequate legal
advice.
In due course, most of the major common law countries
adopted measures reducing or eliminating the opportunities for

avoiding tax through offshore trusts. In the United States, the
opportunities

2.

were largely eliminated

See discussion infra Part IX.

in

the early

1970s;
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Australia and Canada were not far behind; the United Kingdom
moved more gradually, but always in the same direction. The

result was a substantial decline in the traditional market for
offshore trust services. Paradoxically, this untoward development
paved the way for the eventual transformation of the offshore
trust industry.

III. BASIC INGREDIENTS
The basic ingredients required to make a successful offshore
trust center are predictable enough. There must be an adequate
legal system, an adequate judicial system, political stability,
adequate professional services, good communications, and an
absence of significant taxation, exchange controls, or excessive
regulation. Looking at the legal system, it is obviously
fundamental that it should embrace the trust concept and
provide a sufficient body of trust rules. Many of the offshore
centers were in the happy position of being British colonies, or
former colonies, acquired by settlement. They had simply
inherited the entire body of English law, common law, equity, and
statute in force at the time of settlement, insofar as applicable to
the situation of the colonists and the conditions of an infant
colony.
In most cases, this reception of English law was
confirmed by statute in due course. 3 Subsequent English case
law is highly persuasive, and decisions of the Privy Council may
be binding. As in England, the law of trusts remains uncodified
though, as in England, legislation has been enacted for

supplementary purposes.

Centers in this category include

Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands.
Other centers, such as Cyprus, Mauritius and Nauru, which

have had the good fortune to come under British rule or
administration, but already had an established system of law,

have acquired the trust concept by osmosis, legislation, or both.
In some cases, the 'trust" may not be exactly the same as the

3.
In the Cayman Islands, for example, the Interpretation Law provides at
section 40:
All such laws and statutes of England as were, prior to the commencement
of 1 George II cap. 1, esteemed, introduced, used, accepted or received as
laws in the Islands shall continue to be laws in the Islands save insofar as
any such laws or statutes have been, or may be, repealed or amended by
any law of the islands.
Interpretation Law (Cayman Islands), § 40.
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English conception, but the general approach seems to have been
to track England as closely as established local laws permitted.
The Channel Islands are in this category, though it may be
noted that they are a constitutional anomaly-certainly not
colonies, nor yet part of the United Kingdom. They were part of
Normandy when its ruler acquired the English crown in 1066; so
perhaps one should regard the United Kingdom as an appendage
of the Channel Islands, not vice versa.
Curious as the
constitutional position may be, even more curious is the fact that
from the outset the Channel Islands thrived as offshore trust
centers despite lacking what I have described as a basic
ingredient-a legal system that embraces the trust concept and
provides an adequate body of trust rules.
There is no doubt that the Channel Islands had acquired a
"trust" concept by osmosis through long association with England
and the English, but the nature and effect of this "trust" had not
been defined by the courts. Given the fundamental differences
between Norman customary law and English law, particularly in
relation to property, it was plain that this "trust" was not the
same as that of England. Trust rules were equally undefined,
though it was generally expected that the local courts would try
to follow English practice insofar as that was consistent with local
law and procedure.
This may seem to be a rather shaky
foundation upon which to build a trust center, but apparently it
caused little concern among the London lawyers who helped their
clients to choose a trust domicile. Eventually, in 1984, Jersey did
adopt comprehensive trust legislation, and five years later
4
Guernsey followed suit.
The Jersey legislation is well worth examination. Not only
does it provide a comprehensive system of rules, largely derived
from English judge-made principles, it also manages to emulate
the effects of equitable ownership; in other words, it provides

essentially the same proprietary rights and remedies, including
the rule in Saunders v. Vautier that allows the beneficiaries, if all
in existence and sui juris, to terminate the trust and the trust
property regardless of any contrary direction in the trust
instrument.5 However, the Jersey rule is qualified to allow the
court to make a contrary order.6 No indication is given of the

4.
See Trusts Law 1984 (Jersey), consolidated as amended by Trusts
(Amendment) Law 1989 (Jersey), Trusts (Amendment No. 2) Law 1991 (Jersey),
and Trusts (Amendment No. 3) Law 1996, reprintedin WALTER H. DIAMOND ET AL., 1
INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS, JER 101 (1998); The Trusts Law 1989
(Guernsey), reprintedin DIAMOND, supra, at GSY 101.
5.
See 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS A15-24 (Glasson ed., Update 8, May
1997).

6.

See id
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purpose of this qualification; and perhaps one should not jump to
the conclusion that it reflects the American view that the trust
should continue if it is necessary for the achievement of a
material purpose of the trust. That these proprietary features of

the trust do not rest easily on a basis of Norman customary law is
indicated by the provision that a trust is invalid if it purports to
apply directly to immovable property situated in Jersey. 7 The
Jersey legislation also has a number of innovative features, not
borrowed from England, for example a rule limiting the duration
of a trust to one hundred years (instead of the English rules
against perpetuity), 8 and a rule making the directors of a
9
The Jersey
corporate trustee liable for breaches of trust.
legislation has been copied to a greater or lesser extent by several
other offshore centers.
Some countries that inherited English law, as settled
colonies, have nonetheless adopted comprehensive legislation
codifying most of the rules and principles, even to the extent of
adopting a *statutorydefinition of a trust. The Turks and Caicos
Islands are an example.' 0 Presumably, it was thought that this
would attract business by signalling the Islands' enthusiasm for
this business and by providing a readable set of rules. I do not
know to what extent it has been successful in that respect, but it
does seem unwise to jettison the enormous body of case law that
has been developed and refined over the years by the courts of
England and other trust jurisdictions. No brief code, until it has
been thoroughly elucidated by the courts, can match the case law
for breadth, depth, or certainty. No doubt the Turks and Caicos
courts continue to refer to the old cases, insofar as the new rules
permit, so the case law is not abandoned altogether; but the
extent of its application must be unclear for the time being.

IV.

CONFLICT-OF-LAW RULES

One might be forgiven for thinking that another essential
ingredient for an offshore trust center is a sufficient body of
conflict-of-law rules to deal appropriately with the foreign
elements inevitable in the offshore context. All offshore trusts
have a foreign element; usually they have many. The settlor
comes from elsewhere--presumably, that is what we mean when

See id. at
7.
See id. at
8.
See id. at
9.
See, e.g.,
10.
INTERNATIONAL TRUST

Al5-5.
A15-19.
A15-24.
Trusts Ordinance 1990 (Turks & Caicos), § 3, reprinted in 2
LAWS, supranote 5, at D 18-4.
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we use the "offshore" epithet to describe a trust. His residence,
domicile, and nationality are not necessarily in the same place.
The same goes for the beneficiaries. The trust assets, or the
underlying investments or operations, are likely to be wholly or
partly foreign-and scattered-and they may be held through
brokers or other intermediaries who are not necessarily in the
same place. A corporate trustee may handle some of its work in
the trust domicile and some elsewhere; and there may be cotrustees, protectors, or family committees involved in the
administration of the trust. As if all that were not bad enough,
these foreign elements are prone to change from time to time.
Furthermore, the settlor probably wants, and should be advised
to have, a mechanism for changing the trust domicile in case the
chosen offshore center ceases to be suitable.
Even in a case in which all the foreign links are with places
that have the trust concept, important questions may arise
because of differences in, for example, rules on capacity,
formalities, perpetuity, alienability, illegality, implied duties,
powers and protections of trustees, marital rights, and the
protection of creditors. If the trust has links with states that do
not have the trust concept, any application of their laws in
relation to the trust is likely to have disruptive consequences.
Furthermore, most no-trust states have forced heirship, which
adds a further dimension of difficulty, usually subjecting lifetime
dispositions to claw-back, and also bringing in its train a variety
of rules limiting freedom of disposition inter vivos that prevent or
disrupt many of the features commonly found in trusts-for
example, reserved interests, revocable interests, reserved powers
11
of disposition, gifts to spouses, and gifts to unborn persons.
Finally, as the cherry on top of this unpalatable concoction,
conflict-of-law rules vary considerably around the world, so the
answer to any given question depends on which court is
answering; and in many parts of the world, conflict-of-law rules
are not well developed, making it impossible to predict with any

assurance how a given court would answer a given question.
The trust planner must suppress feelings of panic and adopt
a pragmatic, defensive approach aimed at ensuring validity in the
trust domicile and reducing as far as possible the vulnerability of
the trust structure to foreign disruption. Few clients will foot the
bill to undertake a detailed analysis of the laws of all possibly
relevant states; so the planner tries to reduce the risk of a foreign
court assuming jurisdiction over a trust question, and he tries to
increase the likelihood that, if a foreign court did so, it would
apply the law of the trust domicile. If the residual risk still seems

11.

See infra Part VII.
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too high, he tries to reduce the risk that a disruptive foreign
judgement could be enforced effectively.
The planner's task may or may not be easy, depending on the
circumstances; but it is altogether more difficult if the conflict-oflaw rules of the chosen trust domicile are uncertain-for then he

must contend with the risk that the courts of the trust domicile
might apply a disruptive foreign law. Yet, until relatively recently
that was precisely the situation in all the offshore trust centers.
Those centers that had inherited the English trust could look to
England, but the English conflict-of-law rules were, and still are,
surprisingly uncertain in relation to trusts. Those centers that
had acquireda trust concept were in an even more unsatisfactory
condition, it being unclear which system of law one should look
to in order to find the relevant conflict-of-law principles. Stranger
still, this state of affairs caused no great concern in the offshore
centers, or in the onshore centers such as London and New York
where most of the trust planning was done.
Part of the
explanation is that in the early days the typical settlor was from a
common law country, but, as already noted, that did not actually
eliminate risk, in theory or in practice (after all, every gift creates
a class of potential attackers, those who would take the property
if the gift were set aside). Another part of the explanation is that
many trusts were, and are, created without the benefit of
professional planning. Those trusts that were planned were
usually planned by tax advisers whose focus was, naturally, on
the tax considerations. Lawyers in the offshore centers were
seldom involved in the planning process, and were not generally
asked to advise on the conflict-of-law aspects. In any case,
however diligent the planning, there was not much to choose
between the different offshore centers-none offered adequate
conflict-of-law rules.
At this point of the discussion, it is necessary to survey
briefly the English conflict-of-law rules before 1987 when the
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their
Recognition 12 was incorporated into English law, with minor
modifications, by the Recognition of Trusts Act. 13 In the words of
the most influential commentary on this subject, Dicey and Morris
on the Conflict of Laws:

12.

The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their

Recognition, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 5, at D51-1
[hereinafter The Hague Convention].
13.

See PAUL MATTHEWS & TERRY SOWDEN

4.6, at 42 (3d ed. 1993).

Q.C.,

THE JERSEY LAW OF TRUSTS §
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There is a remarkable dearth of English and Commonwealth
authority on what law governs the validity of a trust. This is
particularly true in the case of trusts inter uivos other than those
contained in a marriage settlement. The literature is almost
equally sparse. In these circumstances, anything like a systematic
exposition would be premature. All that can be done is to call
attention to some of the matters which have been the subject of
express decision in this complex field. 14

With that introduction, Dicey suggested that the rule for trusts
inter vivos of movable property is:
The validity, the interpretation and the effect of an inter vivos trust
of movables are governed by its proper law, that is, in the absence
of an express or implied selection of the proper law by the settlor,
the system of law with which the trust has its closest and most real
15
connection.

So far so good, but Dicey added a number of comments and
qualifications, for example:
(1)

(2)

(3)

"Although there is no express English decision to
this effect, there can be no doubt that the settlor
could select the proper law, at any rate if the
trust has a substantial connection with the
chosen law."16 Not very encouraging; and what
in the offshore context amounts to a
"substantial" connection?
"But if there is a strong public policy in the
system of law with which the trust has its
closest and most real connection, it seems
doubtful whether the settlor would be allowed to
evade it by selecting some other law." 17 No
authority was cited for this proposition, and it
was omitted in the next edition.' 8
What
amounts to a "strong public policy"? And how
does one identify the place with the "closest and
most real connection"?
"Although it is desirable that a trust should be

treated as a unit and governed by one law
irrespective of the situs of the movables
contained therein, it does not follow that all
questions of validity are governed by the same

14.
2 DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 674
eds., 10th ed. 1980).

15.
16.
17.
18.
Collins et

(J.H.C.

Morris et al.

Id., rule 120, at 678.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Compare id. tith DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Lawrence
al. eds., 1 1th ed. 1987).
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law."19
The extent of that proposition was
unclear.
As regards the settlor's capacity, Dicey suggested, "The capacity
of the settlor to create the trust is probably governed by the
proper law."20 That tentative conclusion was reached by analogy
with marriage settlement contracts but, even in that rather
different area of the law, Dicey acknowledged uncertainty. It was
said:
The question of what law governs the capacity of the parties to
enter into a marriage settlement contract is a matter of some
difficulty and it is necessary to speak with hesitation. On principle
capacity should be governed by ... the proper law of the contract
....
It is sometime said, however, that capacity is governed by the
2 1
law of the domicile of the party alleged to be incapable.

Dicey then attempts to rationalize the various cases and
concludes that capacity is governed by the proper law of the
contract, but then adds:
The proper law means, in this connection, the system of law with
which the contract is most closely connected, and not the law
intended by the parties. As Lord MacNaghten said in Cooper v.
Cooper 'it is difficult to suppose that Mrs. Cooper could confer
capacity on herself by contemplating a different country as the
22
place where the contract was to be fulfilled'.

On questions of administration-for example, as to the

powers and duties of the trustees, their liability for breach of

trust, their right of indemnity or contribution, their right to
remuneration, the question of what is income and what is capital,
the question of what are proper trustee investments, and who can
appoint a new trustee-Dicey said, "On many of these matters,
English and Commonwealth authority is entirely lacking," 2 3 but

suggested, "As a general rule, questions of administration are
governed by the law of the place of administration. The place of
administration is likely to be the place where the trustees reside
or carry on business, especially if the trustee is a trust
24
corporation."
The English rules were also uncertain with regard to the
feasibility of changing the proper law of a trust. Dicey made the

19.

2 DIcEY & MoRRIS, supra note 15, at 680.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

664.
665-66.
683-84.
684.
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tentative suggestion that it could be changed under a power in
25
the trust instrument to that effect, but no authority was cited.
In relation to testamentary trusts of movables, the English
rules clearly distinguished the validity of the will from the validity
of the trusts it created. 2 6 As regards trusts inter vivos, it was
unclear whether any equivalent distinction should be drawn. If
the trust creation process involved transfers of property to the
trustee, it was clear enough that there were transfer issues, but
trusts can be, and frequently are, created without any such
transfer-either because the settlor is making himself the trustee,
or because the property is already in the hands of the intended
trustee when the settlor gives his direction to hold on trust. In
such cases, should the creation of the trust-that is, the settlor's
declaration or his direction to the trustee-be governed by the
proper law of the trust without regard, for example, to the law of
the place or places where the settled
property is situated? The
27
answer appeared to be affirmative.
All in all, one might say that the indications from England
were encouraging but uncertain, and in an offshore trust center
one needs clearer answers to these basic questions:
(1)
(2)

Does the settlor have complete freedom to
choose the proper law of his trust? Or are there
some conditions or exceptions?
Which issues-for example, capacity, validity,
effect, administration-are governed by the
proper law? And which are governed by, for

example, the law of the settlor's domicile, or the
(3)

law of the places where the settled assets are
situate?
Can the proper law be changed? If so, are there
conditions?

In 1987, the English rules were to some extent clarified by
the Recognition of Trusts Act (adopting the Hague Convention
with minor modifications), 28 but large areas of uncertainty
remain. The answer to the first of my questions is now clear
enough: the settlor's freedom to choose English law to govern his
29
trust is subject to no condition or exception.
My second question has received a little clarification, but the
more difficult parts remain unanswered. The Convention does
not deal with capacity, and it does not apply to "preliminary

25.
26.
27.

Id. at 680.
See id., rule 117, at 675.
See generally id. at 678-8 1.

28.

See 1 INTERNATIONAL TRuST LAWS, supranote 5, at Al-S.

29.

See The Hague Convention, supranote 12, art. 6.
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issues relating to the validity of wills or of other acts by virtue of
which assets are transferred to the trustee."3 0 This establishes a
critical distinction between trust issues and "preliminary" issues.
The Explanatory Report on the Convention employed the colorful
metaphor of a rocket and rocket-launcher. 3 ' One difficulty with
this distinction is the point, already noted, that a trust can be
created without any transfer of property to the trustee.3 2 The
Explanatory Report acknowledged that a trust may be created by
declaration, but then simply stated that "[t]he Commission
unanimously accepted that the acts by which this change in the

capacity in which the assets were held was effectuated must also
be envisaged by article 4 and therefore excluded from the
Convention's scope."3 3 The Explanatory Report did not address
the other possibility, that the assets had already been transferred
to the trustee before the settlor gave his directions to hold them
on trust; but presumably the Commission would have said the
same thing-that is, that the validity of the settlor's directions
was a matter outside the Convention.
Another difficulty in the rocket/launcher distinction is its
application to a case in which the trust is created by a single
transaction, a transfer to the trustee to hold upon trust for
beneficiaries. How does one separate the preliminary issues from
the trust issues?
In any case, whatever the launcher may
comprise, we are no wiser about the choice of law to govern its
various aspects. I am not being critical of the Convention; its
objective was to secure for the trust a measure of recognition by
no-trust states, not to clarify English conflict-of-law rules.3 4 For
its intended purpose, the rocket/launcher distinction is
understandable, clear, and natural; no-trust states are to remain
free to object on any grounds to the creation of a trust. They
undertake to recognize a trust only if its launch was
unobjectionable.
But, if the rocket/launcher distinction is
pressed into service to clarify English conflict-of-law rules, its
virtue in that context is doubtful.
My third question remains uncertain.
The Convention
provides that it is a matter for the proper law to say whether the
proper law can be changed, 35 which puts us no closer to knowing
what English law, if the proper law, says about that.

30.
Id., art. 4.
31.
See Explanatory Report by Alfred E. von Overbeck,
53, reprinted in 1
INTERNATIONAL TRusT LAWS, supranote 5, at C51-13.
32.
See supranotes text accompanying notes 26-27.
33.
Explanatory Report by Alfred E. von Overbeck, supra note 31, 57.
34.
See id. 14.
35.
See The Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 10.
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Jersey was the first offshore center to take a step towards
clarifying its conflict-of-law rules. Its Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984
included several relevant provisions. It was made clear that the
settlor could choose Jersey law to be the proper law of his trust,
36
and this freedom was subject to no condition or exception.
Though there was no statement of the issues governed by the
proper law, there was an implication that the proper law governed
validity to the exclusion of foreign laws but, seemingly, the
settlor's capacity was another matter, probably governed by the
law of the settlor's domicile. 37 Furthermore, the legislation made
it clear that it did not "give validity to any transfer or disposition

of property to a trust which would not otherwise be a valid
transfer or disposition," 38 an exclusion that seems wide enough
to allow a foreign objection to the disposition because of its trust
terms. It was made clear that the proper law may be changed
from that of Jersey to another country-if the terms of the trust
so provide. 3 9 Surprisingly, perhaps, there was no condition as
regards the effect of the new law. Overall, one might say that
Jersey had taken a step in the right direction, but had not
achieved a set of rules that were really sufficient. There is an
evident similarity in the Jersey approach and the Convention
approach-probably no coincidence, as both were concluded in
the same year.
Indeed, with Jersey's approval, the United
Kingdom has extended the Convention to Jersey, and conforming
amendments were made by Jersey in 1991. 4 0 Earlier, in 1989,
amendments had been made that, among other things, limited
the reference to the settlor's domiciliary law on the question of
41
capacity.
Next in line were the Turks and Caicos Islands, which
adopted the Trusts (Special Provisions) Ordinance in 1985.42 The
law established a number of special rules to apply to trusts that
had an "approved trustee," meaning a Turks and Caicos company
meeting certain conditions and approved by the governor.43 One
of the special provisions was that any trust with an approved
trustee would be governed by the law of the Turks and Caicos
Islands and that "the law of any country or territory outside the

36.
See Trusts Law 1984 (Jersey), art. 4, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL
TRUSTS LAWS, supra note 5, at D15-4.

37.

See id. arts. 4-10.

38.

Id.art. 55(l)(G).

39.
40.

See id. art. 37.
See Trusts (Amendment No. 2) Law 1991
INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAW, supranote 5, at D15-19.
41.

See Trusts

(Amendment) Law

1989

(Jersey), reprinted in 2

(Jersey),

reprinted in 2

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTS LAWS, supra note 5, at D 15-17.
42.
See 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at A18-3.

43.

See id. at A18-4.
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Islands shall not be taken cognisance of in relation to any such
trust," except in the case of immovable property. 44 Another
provision was that the capacity to create a trust of movables
would be governed by the law of the Turks and Caicos Islands. 45
The Ordinance made no reference to a distinction between trust
issues and "preliminary" or transfer issues, but some such
distinction may be inferred; otherwise, a transfer of foreign
moveable property would be governed entirely and exclusively by
Turks and Caicos law merely because it was a transfer to an
"approved trustee."
That these rules were not entirely
satisfactory seems to have been acknowledged; a new set of rules
was incorporated in the Trusts Ordinance 1990.46
The Cayman Islands were next with the Trusts (Foreign
Element) Law 1987 (TFEL).4 7 This set out to deal with the
subject comprehensively and to tackle the "preliminary" issues as
well as the trust issues. TFEL established the settlor's complete
freedom to choose the proper law of his trust (referred to in the
legislation as the "governing law").4 8 It enabled a change of
proper law, subject to specified conditions. 4 9 In the case of a
change to Cayman Islands law, the change must be recognized by
the previous governing law; in the case of a change from Cayman
Islands law, the new governing law must recognize the validity of
the trust and the respective interests of the beneficiaries.5 0 TFEL
established that all trust and preliminary issues, including
capacity, validity, and administration, are governed by Cayman
Islands law without reference to the laws of other jurisdictions;5 1
but that rule is subject to a number of exceptions, for example, in
relation to testamentary dispositions,5 2 and also dispositions of
immovable property.5 3 Another exception established that foreign
laws would be recognized in determining whether the settlor was

44.
Trusts (Special Provisions) Ordinance 1985 (Turks & Calcos Islands)
§ 10, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at TUR
101.
45.
See id. at § 9.
46.
See generally The Trust Ordinance 1990 (Turks & Caicos Islands),
reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST Laws, supranote 5, at D 18-3.
47.
See generally Trusts (Foreign Element) Law 1987 (Cayman Islands),
reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at D7-35.
48.
See id. at § 4.
49.
See id.
50.
See id.
51.
See id. § 5.
52.
See id. ("This section does not validate any testamentary trust or
disposition which is invalid according to the laws of the testator's domicile").
53.
See id. § 5(a) ("This section does not validate any trust or disposition of
immovable property situate in a jurisdiction other than the islands which is
invalid according to the laws of such jurisdiction").
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the owner of the property he purported to settle or the holder of a
power enabling him to do so. 5 4 Another important exception
established that the new rules did not "affect the recognition of
foreign laws prescribing generally (without reference to the

existence or terms of the trust) the formalities for the disposition
of property."5 5 And, in this connection, the term "formalities" was
given an extended definition to mean:
the documentary and other actions required generally by the laws
of a relevant jurisdiction for all dispositions of like form concerning
property of like nature, without regard to: (a) the fact that the
particular disposition is made in trust, (b) the terms of the trust, (c)
the circumstances of the parties to the disposition, or (d) any other
particular circumstances, but include any special formalities
required by reason that the party effecting the disposition is not of
full age, is subject to a mental or bodily infirmity or is a
56
corporation.

So the door was left open to the application of foreign laws in
relation to transfer issues, including, to a limited extent, the
settlor's capacity, but not so as to give effect to any foreign
objection to the transfer by reason of it being a transfer in trust
or by reason of the terms or circumstances of the particular trust.
The Cayman approach has proved popular in the sense that
57
it has been the model for several other offshore centers.
However, the only learned commentary of which I am aware
sounds a critical note. In Launching the Rocket-Capacity and the
Creation of Inter Vivos Transnational Trusts, Jonathan Harris
writes:
The whole effect of the Act is, prima facie at least, to give great
freedom to a settlor to confer capacity on himself to dispose of
property. In so doing, it might be said to value pragmatism more
than consistency with conflict of laws principles on capacity and
58
the transfer of property.

Under the circumstances that seems unfair, partly because the
English principles were, and are, so unclear, and partly because
Harris seems to have overlooked the Cayman exception noted

above concerning "formalities" and the admittedly unusual
definition of that word.5 9
Harris provides an illuminating
discussion of the English rules after 1987 (which confirms the

54.
See id. § 5.
Id. § 5(d).
55.
56.
Id. § 2.
57.
See Jonathan Harris, Launching the Rocket-Capacity and the Creation
of Inter Vivos TransnationalTrusts, in 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 5, at
C2-23.
58.

59.

Id. at C2-24.
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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great and continuing uncertainty of the English rules and the
contradictions of the views expressed by commentators) and he
concludes with some suggestions for what the English rules
should be:
1(a) The capacity of any party to dispose of any
property right is governed by the lex situs at the
time of the purported transfer.
(b) The capacity of any party to create a trust of any
property of which he may, according to rule (a),
dispose, is governed by the proper law of the
trust.

60

2(a) Whether any proprietary interest has been
transferred inter vivos from a would-be settlor to
a would-be trustee is determined by the lex situs
at the time of transfer.
(b) Whether the transfer is effective to transfer
equitable title to the would-be beneficiary, and
is
thus to form a completely constituted trust,
61
determined by the proper law of the trust.
There is an evident similarity between the Harris approach
and the Cayman approach: both give some effect to the lex situs,
but objections in the lex situs that arise from the trust aspects of
According to the Harris
the transaction are overridden.
approach, if the lex situs denies the settlor general capacity to
dispose of property, that rule is applied;6 2 on the other hand, if
the lex situs acknowledges general capacity but denies the settlor
particular capacity to make this disposition of property, that rule
is not applied.6 3 If the lex situs denies that the disposition gave
the trustee any interest (and it is not clear what this really means
in the context of civil law concepts of ownership), that rule is
applied; but, if the lex situs denies that the right to the property
has shifted from the settlor to the beneficiaries, that rule is not
applied. 6 4 It seems to me that there is a lot to be said for this

approach, but it is open to question whether it is more principled
than pragmatic. For example, Harris' justification for applying
the proper law of the trust to the question of whether equitable
title has passed from the settlor to the beneficiaries is in the
following passage:

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Harris, supranote 57, at C2-16.
See id. at C2-22.
See id. at C2-16.
See id.
See id. at C2-22.
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Technically, one could argue that two questions arise as to the
passing of property: (i) the transfer of legal title to the trustee; and
(ii) the transfer of equitable title to the beneficiary. The latter
question arises because, in the words of Sykes and Pryles, 'the
trust document may therefore be viewed as a type of equitable
conveyance.' Thus, if A purports to transfer property to B to hold
on trust for C, the lex situs might permit the transfer of property to
B, but not accept the validity of the equitable transfer. Accordingly,
one could argue that the lex situs should apply to both questions.
Yet this cannot be correct in principle. Otherwise, it would seem to
preclude e.g. the creation in England of a trust of land situated in

any country where the passing of equitable ownership is not
permitted or recognised, even if English law is stated to be the
governing law of the trust. Indeed, it would seem to prevent the
creation of a trust, the assets of which are held in a country which
does not have any analogous concept to that of equitable
65
ownership.

One can see the force of this argument, but is it principled or
pragmatic?
The fundamental question for all trust states is
whether there can be a trust of property situated in a foreign
state that denies the validity of the trust or insists that the effects
are not those prescribed by the trust law. If the answer to that
were negative, the utility of the trust would be substantially
reduced. That seems to be Harris' point. I agree with the point,
but I would call it pragmatic. The principled justification is,
presumably, that while the trust may be regarded (by common
lawyers) as a mechanism for giving property to beneficiaries, it
may also be regarded as the creation (and release) of obligations
and rights in relation to property. This explanation suggests an
analogy with contract and, in that context, the lex situs generally
does not override the proper law.
A feature of the Harris approach that emerges from the body
of his paper is that his suggested rules are to apply equally in a
case where there is in fact no transfer of property from the settlor
to the trustee.6 6 So, for example, a settlor lacks capacity to
declare himself a trustee if the lex situs denies his general
capacity to dispose of property. The suggestion seems to be that

the application of the rule is necessary in order to give the lex
situs the same effect regardless of the method that the settlor
employs to launch his trust. Harris' argument is that otherwise a
settlor who lacks dispositive capacity under the lex situs can
circumvent his incapacity by declaring a trust under which he
may then be compelled to transfer the property to the
beneficiary. 6 7 I am not sure that I see the force in that argument.
If and for so long as the lex situs denies the settlor's capacity, it

65.
66.
67.

Id. at C2-17.
See id. at C2-3 to C2-30.
See id.
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will prevent him transferring to the beneficiary, so that particular
trust obligation cannot be performed (if it arises while the settlor
is still incapable) unless the lex situs provides or recognizes a
process by which the property of incapable persons can be
transferred. In other words, recognition of the trust does not
circumvent the lex situs. In any case, I am not sure why one
should be shy about the idea that different methods of launching
a trust have different effects in terms of the application of foreign
laws. At this rate, it will be suggested that the validity of a
settlement of cash in State A will to some extent be governed by
the law of State B if it was the intention that the trustee would
use some of the cash to buy property in State B-the argument
being that this was a roundabout method of launching a trust of
It seems to me that the Convention's
property in State B.
distinction between rocket and launcher has been allowed to
confuse the issue.
The Cayman approach distinguishes (1) the transfer, if any,
to the trustee, from (2) the creation of trust obligations to be
performed by the trustee. The creation of trust obligations is a
matter for the proper law of the trust. Everything is relatively
straightforward if the trust is created in two stages: first, a
transfer of property by the settlor to the trustee to hold on the
settlor's behalf; second, a direction by the settlor to the trustee to
hold upon trust for the beneficiaries. In such cases, TFEL has no
application to the first stage, the transfer, and, on English
principles, it seems the lex situs (and, in the case of intangibles,
the constituent law) will govern. 68 The second stage, the creation
of trust obligations, is governed by the proper law of the trust.
The difficulty arises in the case where these two stages are
combined in one transaction, a transfer to the trustee to hold
upon trust for the beneficiaries. The Cayman approach is, in
effect, to split the transaction, to approach it as though it had
been done in two stages, allowing foreign laws to apply in relation
to the first stage (notional transfer to the trustee to hold for the
settlor), but not the second. If the settlor chooses to launch his
trust by declaring himself to be the trustee, there is no question
of a transfer; there is only the creation of trust obligations. That
is a matter for the proper law. By whichever method the trust is
launched, the ability of the trustee to transfer trust property to
beneficiaries, if and when that becomes the trustee's obligation,

Admittedly, if the foreign law is not a common law, there may be some
68.
difficulty in formulating the question to be referred to the foreign law, and perhaps
this is what prompted Harris to express his Rule 2a in terms of "any proprietary
interest," though I am not sure that really takes us any further in understanding
the English rule.

898

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:879

will be dependent on the laws of the places where the trust
property is then situate. Meanwhile, there is a perfectly good
trust. The TFEL drafting might be improved, but I still consider
that its approach is good.
Not all of the offshore centers have followed the Cayman
model. Jersey has been mentioned already. 6 9 In 1989, it took a
further important step and introduced the rule that
[i]f a person domiciled outside Jersey transfers or disposes of
property during his lifetime to a trust-(a) he shall be deemed to
have capacity to do so if he is at the time of such transfer or
disposition of full age and of sound mind under the law of his
70
domicile.

Jersey, therefore, adheres to the notion that capacity is a matter
for the settlor's domicile, even in the case of a trust inter vivos,
but application of the lex domiciliiis limited to matters of age and
mental faculty. Surprisingly, in my view, there has been no
adjustment of the provision that "nothing in this Law shall ...
give validity to any transfer or disposition of property to a trust
71
which would not otherwise be a valid transfer or disposition."
This seems to leave the door open to any foreign objection, even if
it concerns capacity, and even if it arises precisely because it is a
transfer in trust or because of the particular terms of the trust.
Possibly Jersey takes the view that these are issues that can and
should be avoided in practice by the simple expedient of localizing
the property before settlement. The usual method is for the
settlor to put his foreign assets into an offshore holding company
in exchange for an issue of that company's shares, which he then
settles upon the trust.
Indeed, this practice is to be
recommended unless there is some extraneous objection, for
example, untoward tax consequences.
V. THE NEW CLIENT

At the end of Section I, I noted that tax measures adopted by
the major common law countries resulted in a substantial decline
in the traditional market for offshore trust services.7 2 Initially,
this did not cause any great alarm or despondency; the same
financial institutions that provided trust services also provided a
variety of other financial services, including corporate
69.
See supra Part IV.
70.
Trusts (Amendment) Law 1989 (Jersey), art. 1, reprinted in 2
INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWs, supra note 5, at D15-17.
71.
Trusts Law 1984 (Jersey), art. 5(1)(G), 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS,
supranote 5, at D15-16.
72.
See supra Part I.
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management. Overall, business continued to expand. As far as I
am aware, institutions did not at first increase significantly their
efforts to sell their trust services in new parts of the world.
However, in Hong Kong, the prospect of a return to China was
developing a substantial demand for trust services; and fairly
quickly, the virtues of the trust became widely known in many
expatriate Chinese communities. Perhaps this also contributed
to the worldwide phenomenon of "private banking," financial
institutions making major efforts to seek out and secure the
business of wealthy people (in the usual jargon, "high net worth
individuals"). Whatever the causes of the phenomenon, there was
swift recognition of the fact that trust services were especially
important-not that they were more profitable than other kinds of
financial service, but that there was no better way to deepen and
make secure a relationship with a wealthy client and extend that
relationship to his family than by taking on the trusteeship of his
family trust. Inevitably, the focus was on no-trust states; wealthy
people in the trust states had little use for offshore trust services
unless there was a tax advantage to be obtained, and by this time
such advantages were scarce in the major common law states.
Selling the trust idea in no-trust states was initially difficult,
unless the client or his local advisers had encountered it already;
but the word soon spread and, of course, the fundamentals were
strong: the trust is an excellent estate planning solution in all
circumstances unless the relevant tax authorities have decided to
penalize its use.
So now the offshore trust industry has a new typical client.
The old client came from one of the major common law countries;
the new client comes from Latin America, Continental Europe,
the Middle East, or the Far East; and he brings with him different
objectives, attitudes, and problems. It is these differences, and
the keen desire of the financial institutions to accommodate
them, that account for most of the changes in offshore trust law
and practice.
In the new client's baggage we found, for example:
(1)
(2)

forced heirship;
a desire to retain control over investment and
management decisions;
(3) a propensity for unorthodox investments, and no
desire to use the client's home currency as the
measure of value and performance;
(4) a desire for extra protection against the risks of
using this alien structure;
(5) a desire for confidentiality; and

900

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
(6)

[VoL 32:879

unfamiliarity with the trust idea-on the part of
the client and, often, his trusted advisers.

These are discussed in Sections VI to XI below. As will be seen,
the focus shifts from tax planning to trust planning-though
obviously tax is still an important consideration.

VI. FORCED HEIRSHIP

A. Introduction
At the outset, few of us realized that forced heirship was a
problem. If other legal systems restricted testamentary freedom,
surely that was simply another good reason for creating an
offshore trust inter vivos. Even when we gathered that forced
heirship regimes might be hostile to trusts, we were not much
concerned. We knew very little about these foreign laws and we
did not think it was our business to know about them. It was up
to the settlor to take advice in his own country, and most of these
settlors were wealthy cosmopolitan individuals attended by plenty
of advisers.
If we appreciated that the trust might not be

recognized in the settlor's own country, this caused mild concern
at most. Surely the only thing that really mattered was that the
trust should be recognized in the offshore center? Gradually,
however, we came to realize that we stand at the point of contact
between two fundamentally opposed legal philosophies, and, in
consequence, there are real difficulties for the trust planner to
solve.
Common law systems impose on parents a duty to care for
their children and provide for their financial needs until they are
able to provide for themselves. But the child has no further
rights in relation to his parents' property. Remoter descendants
have no rights at all. There are, of course, intestacy rules; but
these rules do not override the testator's wishes if expressed in
proper form. By contrast, the general rule in civil law systems is
that the bulk of an individual's property must pass on death to
his descendants immediately and unconditionally, in equal
shares per stirpes, regardless of his wishes or their needs. If
there are no descendants, then parents and remoter ascendants
take instead. If the differences between the common law and the
civil law stopped there, the resulting difficulties would be
relatively minor. Nearly all legal systems agree, in relation to
movable property at least, that succession is governed by the law
of the deceased's own state (though there are differences as to the
relevant connecting factor, whether that is nationality, domicile,
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or habitual residence). But the differences do not stop there. In
most forced heirship regimes, the same policy that restricts
testamentary freedom also leads to restrictions on the individual's
These lifetime
freedom to dispose of property inter vivos.
restrictions come in a variety of forms, not all of which are
obviously related to forced heirship. The civil law approach stops
short of saying that property belongs to the family rather than the
individual, but it reflects a compromise between individual and
family ownership.
By way of illustration, the next subsection outlines the
French regime. France has been chosen because it has been so
influential on the regimes of other civil law states. First, however,
The
I would like to place this discussion in perspective.
confrontation with forced heirship is not merely a problem for
offshore centers or offshore trusts. Forced heirship threatens all
trusts, onshore as well as offshore, and all other transactions
that have a gratuitous element- gifts, covenants, and even
contracts if entered into for less than full value. As a practical
matter, the threat may be more worrying for an offshore center,

but it extends just the same to all other common law states.
Whenever an individual enters into a gratuitous transaction,
there is a risk that sooner or later the transaction will be attacked
by his heirs or representatives with the argument that the
transaction was invalid from the outset or that the heirs have the
right to claw-back the gift or claim compensation. The risk exists
even though at the time of the transaction the individual has no
connection with a civil law system.
B. France
In France, the individual's power of testamentary disposition
is limited to a portion of his property, the disposable portion
(quotite disponible).73 On his death, the rest of his property, the
reserved portion (reserve hereditaire)devolves without regard to
his wishes upon the persons prescribed by law, the forced heirs.
The size of the reserved portion depends on whether the
individual is survived by descendants or ascendants. If there are
none, there is no reserved portion. If there is one living child (or
a deceased child with living issue), the reserved portion is onehalf of the estate. If there are two such children, the reserved

73.
For more discussion of France's laws regarding testamentary
dispositions, see generally C. Civ. (France), Book 3, Titles 1-2; EUROPEAN
SUCCESSION LAWS (David Hayton ed., Chancery Law Publishing 1998); LAWRENCE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL TAX PLANNING ENCYCLOPAEDIA (Butterworths & Co.

Publishers 1991).
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portion is two-thirds of the estate. If there are more, it is threeIf there are no children or other
quarters of the estate.
descendants, but there are surviving ascendants in both
maternal and paternal lines, the reserved portion is one-half of
the estate. If there are ascendants in one line only, it is onequarter of the estate.
The same restriction applies during the lifetime of the
individual. In principle, lifetime gifts may be made only from the
disposable portion. However, the calculation of the disposable
and reserved portions cannot be made until the donor's death
and so lifetime gifts are valid for the time being but may have to
be reduced or returned on the donor's death. This is the clawback feature mentioned already.
For the purpose of calculating the disposable and reserved
portions and the entitlements of the forced heirs, the actual
estate left by the deceased individual is grossed up by the
amount of all gifts made in his lifetime. This applies to all gifts,
including gifts in trust, however long before the date of death they
were made and regardless of whether the motive of the gift was to
avoid or adjust the entitlements of the forced heirs. The reserved
portion is calculated by reference to this grossed-up amount and
hence, the entitlement of each forced heir. If a forced heir has
received lifetime gifts, these are charged against his share, and
his entitlement is reduced accordingly.
If the actual estate is sufficient to cover the entitlements of
the forced heirs, legacies granted by will may be paid from the
excess, and lifetime gifts are safe from claw-back. If the actual
estate is insufficient to cover the entitlements of the forced heirs,
no legacies can be paid, and lifetime gifts are subject to clawback (reduction)in inverse order-that is, the most recent first, in
order to make up the deficit.
For example, if an individual died with an actual estate of ten
million francs but in his lifetime had made gifts totalling six
million francs, the entitlements of the forced heirs would be
calculated by reference to a fictitious estate of sixteen million
francs. For simplicity we assume there was no surviving spouse.
If there were one surviving child, his forced share-the whole of
the reserved portion- would be half this amount (eight million
francs). Of the actual estate, this would leave two million francs
to pay the legacies granted under the individual's will. If the will
purported to grant legacies of a greater amount, they would be
abated ratably, subject to any contrary direction in the will.
If, in the same example, the individual had been survived by
three children instead of one, the reserved portion would be
three-quarters of sixteen million francs (twelve million francs), or
four million francs per child, a figure in excess of the actual
estate. As a result, legatees under the will would receive nothing.
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Further, the forced heirs could require reduction of the lifetime
gifts in inverse order. Recipients of the more recent gifts would
be obliged to compensate the forced heirs to the tune of two
million francs, regardless of whether they still held the gifted
property.
The recipient of a gift subject to claw-back is not excused by
the fact that he has consumed or disposed of the gifted property.
If the recipient did dispose of the property and is now
impecunious, the forced heirs may challenge the disponee,
whether he took by gift or by purchase for value, with or without
notice, unless the heirs consented to the disposition inter vivos.
It seems that the claw-back rules do not generally invalidate
the gift; they merely give the forced heirs rights of recovery or
compensation. But the validity of the gift presumably could be
challenged if it was evasive-if it was made for the purpose of
avoiding or adjusting forced heirship rights-or if it breached any
of the other rules, noted below, restricting freedom of disposition.
The surviving spouse has no forced heirship rights in French
law. Marital property rights are normally fixed by agreement

between the spouses at the time of marriage. They may agree, if
they wish, upon complete separation of property, but in the
absence of agreement to the contrary, the law imposes a
community of property regime, giving each spouse an equal
interest in property acquired by either of them during the
marriage. On death (or divorce) the community is dissolved and
the property is divided between the surviving spouse and the
estate of the deceased spouse. The heirs and legatees of the
deceased spouse participate in the net estate after accounting to
the surviving spouse for his community share.
The surviving spouse does have one advantage in regard to
succession. Subject to certain strict limits, a testator may make
provision for his spouse out of the reserved portion of the estate,
thus reducing or postponing the interests of the forced heirs.
Ancillary to the forced heirship regime and claw-back, there
are other dispositive restrictions whose purpose is to promote or
protect the interests of the next generation (and the fisc). Even as
regards the disposable portion of his estate, the individual is
strictly limited in his ability to create successive interests or
confer benefits on future generations.
Before the French
Revolution, the law was more permissive, to such extent that
much of the land was tied up for future generations by means of
fideicommissum, a concept of Roman law with resemblances to
the strict settlement of English law. As a general rule
fideicommissum is now prohibited, though there are exceptions.
For present purposes, the most important exception is that a
parent may give property to a child on terms that ownership will
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pass on the child's death to the child's children; but this
concession applies only if it is a gift to all of the child's children in
equal shares regardless of age, sex or other circumstances.
A restriction that relates only to lifetime dispositions is the
rule donneret retenirne vaut (to give and keep back is invalid). In
general, a gift is ineffective so long as the donor retains
possession of, or any freedom of disposition over, the property.
Revocable interests or dispositions are generally impossible, but
there are exceptions to this rule; and there are occasions when
revocation occurs by operation of law, if, for example, a childless
donor later has a child. Conditional gifts are also subject to
heavy restriction. There are restrictions upon donations or
bequests in favor of charitable and other institutions-or, to be
exact, there are restrictions upon the capacity of institutions to
accept gifts.
There are strict formalities for gifts, even of movable property.
For most types of property there must be a notarial acte; the
donee's acceptance of the gift must be recorded in the acte; a full
inventory with values must be prepared; and, in the case of real
property, the acte must be registered at the Bureau des
Hypotheques. Lawyers have expended much ingenuity in
circumventing the notarization rule, and the French courts have
been quite accommodating in this respect.
France's succession rules apply:
(1) to the movable estate wherever situate of a
person who at the time of death was habitually
resident in France; and
(2) to the immovable estate located in France of a
person wherever resident.
A rule that has been much criticized in France and elsewhere
gives heirs of French nationality special rights. Even if the
deceased was not a habitual resident of France and had no
immovable property in France, French law will intervene on
behalf of any heirs of French nationality, conferring upon them
the same forced heirship entitlements as they would have enjoyed
if the succession had been governed by French law, and
permitting the French heirs to effect recovery of their entitlements
against any French property.
To summarize, the clear policy of French law is that the
property owned by a person is a fund (patrimoine)that should be
handed down from one generation to the next, and which should
be preserved from the generosity of the owner. This policy is
achieved by a combination of (1) succession rules restricting
testamentary power to the disposable portion, (2) claw-back of
lifetime dispositions if they prove to exceed the disposable
portion, (3) very limited legal mechanisms for creating partial
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interests in property or for tying it up for successive generations
(in other words, no functional equivalent of the trust), (4) a
miscellany of other substantive restrictions, and (5) onerous
formalities for dispositions.
The claw-back rules are particularly troublesome. French
claw-back is:
(1)

unlimited in time (i.e., regardless of how long
before death the gift was made);
(2) not an anti-avoidance rule: it applies regardless
of whether the individual was trying to avoid or
adjust the rights of his heirs;
(3) remorseless: it makes no difference that the
donee has used, spent or lost the gift. If he
cannot return it, he must compensate the heirs;
(4) unfriendly to trusts, in the sense that it gives no
credit for trust interests given to the heirs: they
can insist on outright ownership of their
inheritance without strings or conditions;
(5) unpredictable: when an individual makes a
disposition in his lifetime, one can only guess
what will be his circumstances (personal,
familial, and financial) at the time of his death.
No gift is entirely free of risk; an English donor
may eventually move to France;
(6) a blot on the title to property: if the donee has
parted with
the property
and
is now
impecunious, the heirs may be able to trace the
property into the hands of whoever now has it,
even though acquired by purchase for value; and
(7) non-waivable: There is nothing that the donor or
the donee can do nothing about the claw-back
risk. Even if the probable heirs are of full age,
they cannot give an effective waiver.
C. Forms of Attack
Suppose that an individual creates a trust inter vivos and
eventually dies under circumstances that subject his succession

to Ruritanian law. Suppose it transpires that the actual estate is
insufficient to satisfy the rights of the forced heirs under
Ruritanian law. Of course, the heirs could obtain a favorable
decision from the Ruritanian courts, but let us suppose there is
no person or property in Ruritania against which the heirs could
enforce their rights. So the heirs decide to commence an action
in the trust domicile. There may be several possible claims:
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Property: The heirs may claim that their rights
under Ruritanian law amounted to a proprietary
interest in the settlor's property during his
lifetime, an interest that was not overridden by
the settlement.
Capacity: The heirs may claim that the settlor,
because he had children, lacked capacity to
make a disposition of this nature.
Validity: The heirs may claim that the settlement
was invalid, perhaps because the settlor's
purpose was to avoid or adjust the rights of
forced heirs, or because he reserved a beneficial
interest for himself and powers of disposition.
Or perhaps the objectionable feature was that
Ruritanian gift formalities were not observed.
Direct enforcement The heirs may claim that
Ruritanian law gives them claw-back rights that
the forum should recognize and enforce. Thus,
the trustee and any beneficiaries who have
received distributions should return the settled
property; if that cannot be done, compensation
should be paid.
Restitution: The heirs may claim that the trust
beneficiaries have been unjustly enriched at the
expense of the heirs.
Tort The heirs may claim that the trustee and
the settlor's advisers who assisted him to create
the trust are guilty of interfering with the heirs'
rights, so they are liable in damages.

Applying English principles, it does seem improbable that the
heirs could succeed in any such claim. Since the early Middle
Ages, the English rule has been nemo est heres viventis: a living
person has no heirs. Nonetheless, as has already been. noted,
there is a great dearth of judicial authority, and when one looks
closely at each of the possible claims and the principles that an
English court might apply in relation to it, one does encounter
some real issues, at least in relation to a trust in which the

settlor's reserved interests and powers are such that the trust
may be regarded as a will-substitute. Space does not permit me
to embark on a discussion of these issues, but I hope I have said
enough to show why the offshore centers saw the need for specific
legislation in relation to forced heirship to remove any doubt
about where the line should be drawn.
Of course, there are other strategies available to the heirs,
other than a frontal attack in the trust domicile. They may be
able to obtain satisfaction in the settlor's country if they can find
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trust property or trust beneficiaries there. If trust-controlled
companies have assets there, it may be possible to pull aside the
corporate veil. Another strategy may be to obtain a judgment in
the settlor's country and then enforce it in other places where
persons or property can be found, perhaps even the trust
domicile. On English principles, that may be possible depending
upon the circumstances of the particular case, unless the trustee
or other defendant can persuade the court that to do so would be
offensive to public policy.
The main argument would be,
presumably, that it is against public policy that all dispositions of
property inter vivos at less than full value should be blighted by a
claw-back risk that cannot be assessed until the disponer's
death. Nevertheless, the Hague Convention on Trusts provides a
counterargument of sorts. Convention states have acknowledged
expressly that a foreign state may withhold recognition of a trust
inter vivos that eventually interferes with the succession rights of
the settlor's heirs.
So, can a Convention country say that
enforcement of a foreign judgment giving effect to those
succession rights is against its public policy?
The Hague
Convention on Succession, if ratified without reservation, would
make matters much worse, for it appears to accept the civil law

view that the heirs' claw-back claims with respect to property
disposed of by the deceased in his lifetime should be
characterized as a matter of succession, governed by the law
indicated by the Convention.
D. The Offshore Legislation
The Cayman Islands were the first to adopt legislation
dealing specifically with forced heirship. The Trusts (Foreign
Element) Law 1987 has been noted already.
Its special
provisions, as amended in 1995, read:
Exclusion of Foreign Law
6.
Subject to the same provisos as set out in paragraphs (a) to
(f) inclusive of section 5, it is expressly declared that no trust
governed by the laws of the Islands and no disposition of property
to be held upon the trusts thereof is void, voidable, liable to be set
aside or defective in any fashion, nor is the capacity of any settlor
to be questioned, nor is the trustee or any beneficiary or any other
person to be subjected to any liability or deprived of any right, by
reason that (a)
the laws of any foreign jurisdiction prohibit or do not
recognise the concept of a trust; or
(b)
the trust or disposition avoids or defeats rights, claims
or interests conferred by foreign law upon any person by

reason of a personal relationship to the settlor or by way
of heirship rights, or contravenes any rule of foreign law
or any foreign judicial or administrative- order or action
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intended to recognise, protect, enforce or give effect to
any such rights, claims or interests.
Heirship rights
6A.
An heirship right conferred by foreign law in relation to the
property of a living person shall not be recognised as (a) affecting the ownership of immovable property in the
Islands or moveable property wherever situate for the
purposes of paragraph (a) of section 5 or for any other
purpose; or
(b) constituting an obligation or liability for the purposes of
the Fraudulent Dispositions Law, 1989 or for any other
purpose.
Foreign Judgments
6B. A foreign judgment shall not be recognised or enforced or
give rise to any estoppel insofar as it is inconsistent with section 6
or section 6A. 7 4

These provisions have been borrowed in whole or part by many of
the other offshore centers, but some have ploughed their own
furrow. Jersey, for example, dealt with the subject quite briefly,
providing in its 1989 amendment:
If a person domiciled outside Jersey transfers or disposes of
property during his lifetime to a trust . . . no rule relating to
inheritance or succession (including, but without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing, forced heirship, 'legitime' or similar
rights) of the law of his domicile or any other system of law shall
affect any such transfer or disposition or otherwise affect the
75
validity of such trust.

Perhaps the legislator took the view that the other possible
grounds of attack7 6 were covered by implication or stood no
prospect of success in any event. Or perhaps he felt constrained
by the fact that Jersey itself has forced heirship.
Obviously, none of this offshore legislation removes the need
for care in both the planning and the administration of a trust.
The question remains: if the settlor dies in circumstances that
subject his succession to a forced heirship regime, will the heirs
have a claim against the trust? And, if they do, will they find a
court that is sympathetic to their claims and is in a position to
enforce its decisions and upset the trust arrangements? Space
does not permit a full discussion of planning techniques, but it is
worth noting that if, as is nearly always the case, the prospective
heirs are beneficiaries of the trust, much can be achieved by
74.
Trusts (Foreign Element) (Amendment) Law 1995 (Cayman Islands),
reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 5, at D7-38.
75.
Trusts (Amendment) Law 1989 (Jersey), art. 1, 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST
LAWs, supranote 5, at D15-17.
76.
See supra Part VI.C.
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appropriate drafting of the trust instrument. For example, a "nocontest" clause can be included so that, if an heir attacks the
trust, he will lose his trust interest; and, if his attack fails, he will
end up with nothing. Sometimes provisions of this sort are put
on a discretionary footing, so that the trustee is given the
decision whether to exclude the heir/beneficiary. The trouble is
that this puts the trustee into a difficult position, and the trustee
may well be reluctant to act without a direction from the court.
The court may also feel some reluctance. After all, the settlor has
signalled that an attacking beneficiary should not necessarily be
excluded-so what should be the criteria for making this
decision? The better approach seems to be to have automatic
exclusion, coupled with a power to reinstate a beneficiary who
repents and makes good any loss or expense that he has caused.
Another important practical consideration is the accessibility
of trust information, the information that an heir would need in
order to plan and execute an attack. For example, the heir would
want to know in what jurisdictions the trust had investments.
Under English principles, it is unclear to what extent the trust
instrument may restrict the beneficiaries' access to trust
77
information, so care is needed.
The Cayman Islands case of Lemos v. Coutts & Co. is an
illustration of both of these practical points, "no-contest" clauses
(in that case discretionary and ultimately ineffectual) and access
to information. 78 Lemos taught various useful lessons, not least
that a trust is inherently difficult to defend from a forced heirship
attack if it has substantial links with the jurisdiction whose laws
govern the setflor's succession-if, for example, assets and
operations of the trust or its controlled companies are situate
there.7 9 In the end, the dispute was settled. At no stage did the
plaintiffs attempt a frontal attack on the trust in the Cayman
Islands.

77.

Information rights are discussed in more detail in Part X below.

78.
[1992-93] C.I.L.R. 460, 481-82, 508 (Cayman Is., Ct. App. 1993). (The
plaintiffs were claiming that as beneficiaries they should have access to trust
information, but other beneficiaries and the trustee argued, with partial success,

that the information should be denied or restricted because it was being sought to
facilitate an action brought by the plaintiffs in Greece to set aside the trust or
claim claw-back rights).

79.

See id. at 481-82.
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RETAINING CONTROL

It is understandable that many "new clients" are reluctant to
surrender all control over the investment and management of the
settled assets.
Several techniques have been employed for
achieving their wishes, not all of them good.
A. Letter of Wishes
I have already alluded to the use of non-binding letters of
wishes in relation to distribution decisions; they have also been
used as a means of giving the settlor de facto influence or control
over investment decisions. 80 Quite simply, the letter of wishes
invites the trustee to consult with the settlor before making
important decisions. So far so good, but sometimes the letter
goes further and indicates that the trustee should act on the
settlor's directions; and plainly, that is not good at all. If the

trustee acts accordingly, it will be in breach of its fiduciary
obligation to make its own decisions. The trustee will have to pay
for the settlor's bad decisions, and it will probably not be allowed
to offset the profits generated by his good decisions. From the
settlor's viewpoint, the arrangement is unsatisfactory because it
gives him no effective reassurance; his continued control of
investment decisions depends on the trustee's continued
willingness to act in breach of its obligations. Worse still, such a
letter may constitute powerful evidence that the trust instrument
is a sham, that it pretends to give the trustee discretion while the
true understanding is that the trustee will do as it is told.
B. The Lucking Clause
In memory of the English case, Re Lucking's Will Trusts,81
"Lucking clause" is the name often given to provisions in trust
instruments that declare the trustee may leave the management
of controlled companies to others and refrain from interference
unless there is actual notice of wrongdoing. This clause is
sometimes employed when the plan is that the trust will hold all
its assets through a holding company, and the settlor or his
designees will be appointed as the directors of the companyhence giving him de facto control of operations. Under English
principles, such a clause is legitimate, but the trustee needs to

80.
81.

See supraPart II.
[1967] 3 All E.R. 726.
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understand its effect.
Some trustees make the mistake of
thinking that the clause absolves them of their duty to take care
in choosing the directors and their duty to supervise the activities
of the directors. Of course, it does not.
A more extreme form of Lucking clause is sometimes used,
one that purports to exclude the trustee's duties of care and
supervision and that actually prohibits the trustee from
interference unless there is notice of wrongdoing. Some clauses
even purport to prohibit the trustee from seeking information
about the company and its operations. The validity and effect of
these super-Lucking clauses is open to doubt. Under English
principles, the court would surely be most reluctant to accept
that neither the trustee nor anyone else who is accountable to the
beneficiaries has responsibility for managing the property. One
possible conclusion is that the settlor (and other directors of the
company) are held to be fiduciaries with responsibilities to the
trust's beneficiaries. Another is that the clause is simply invalid
as being repugnant to the trust idea; the trustee has a duty to
use its powers as shareholder prudently in the interests of the
beneficiaries. In any case, it seems that these clauses do not
purport to displace the trustee's duty to choose directors with
care-indeed, it seems proper to conclude that extra care is
required if the directors are to be immune from subsequent
supervision or removal. Conceivably, another possible outcome
is that the trust is struck down for lack of a genuine intention on

the part of the settlor to create an immediate trust for the benefit
of anyone other than himself. As far as I am aware, none of these
questions has yet been tested in an offshore court.
C. Reserved Powers
Plainly, the straightforward technique is for the settlor to
reserve appropriate powers in the trust instrument. For example,
the trust instrument may reserve a power to issue investment
directions and require the trustee to comply with these
directions. The power may be exclusive (the trustee may only act
as and when directed by the settlor) or non-exclusive (the trustee
may act in its own discretion in the absence of contrary directions
from the settlor). This is certainly a legitimate approach, but care
is still required to ensure that the desired result is achieved.
Questions for consideration include:
(1)

Should the settlor hold his power in a fiduciary
or non-fiduciary capacity? If an extensive power
is held by him in a non-fiduciary capacity,
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particularly if it is held on an exclusive basis, it
82
may cast doubt on the validity of the trust;
(2) If the settior's power is fiduciary, he must act in
the interests of the beneficiaries, and he is also
subject to other fiduciary obligations-for
example, no profit, no conflicting interest or
duty, and no delegation.
Should these
obligations be modified?
(3) Should the trustee keep informed or prompt the
settlor when decisions are required and react
when the settior's decisions seem inappropriate?
These duties will probably be implied unless the
trust instrument says otherwise;
(4) Will there be a clear dividing line between
matters that are the responsibility of the settlor
and matters that are the responsibility of the
trustee?
(5) What is to happen when the settlor dies, or if he
becomes incompetent? If the trustee may then
find itself with responsibility for an unorthodox
collection of investments or other difficult-tomanage property, careful drafting is needed to
establish a safe liquidation process;
(6) Will the settlor's involvement shift the situs of
the trust for tax or other purposes to the settlor's
country? Will it undo the purpose for which the
settlor wanted an offshore trust in the first
place?
D. Powerto Change Trustees
The settlor may be satisfied with a simple power to change
trustees. If he keeps sufficiently informed about the trustee's
investment activities, he will have power to intervene effectively.
Again, there are questions to be considered, for example, whether
the settlor's power should be held in a fiduciary capacity, and
whether his choice of new trustees should be restricted by
qualification requirements. In general, however, this appears to
be a relatively simple and satisfactory solution.

82.

For a discussion of such trusts, see infra Section X.
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E. A Private Trust Company
The settlor incorporates a company to act as the trustee of
his trust. Typically, a professional trust company is appointed to
manage the private trust company and look after the day-to-day
administration of the trust. The settlor can put himself or other
persons of his choice onto the board of the private trust company
(PTC). This has become a popular solution for large trusts, but,
once again, there are several questions that require careful
consideration, such as:
(1)

The sham question: If the settlor genuinely
intends that the PTC will observe its fiduciary
obligations at all times, there should be no
question of sham; but, if he really means to do
as he pleases regardless of fiduciary obligations,
the structure will be eminently attackable.
(2) The ownership question: If the settlor owns the
shares of the PTC, they will fall into his estate
upon death,
and perhaps
his personal
representatives or heirs will interfere with his
plans. The usual solutions are:
(a) to incorporate the PTC as a company limited
by guarantee-then there will be no shares to
fall into the settlor's estate, and his
membership of the company can simply
terminate upon his death; or
(b) to establish a charitable trust to own the
shares of the PTC. Obviously, there must be
a genuine charitable intent, and the trustee
of the charitable trust must act bona fide in
the interests of charity, not in the interest of
the beneficiaries of the underlying trust; or
(c) to establish a non-charitable purpose trust
83
to hold the shares of the PTC.
(3) The conflict question: If the directors of the PTC
include beneficiaries,
they will inevitably
encounter conflicts of interests in administering
the trust.
Likewise, if the directors include
executives of companies owned by the trust,
they may have conflicts of interest or duty. Is
that acceptable? To some extent, the dangers

83.

For a discussion of such trusts, see infra. Section XIII.
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can be mitigated by, for example, separate
boards or committees of the PTC to deal with
different aspects of the trust administration.
The remedy question: If the PTC commits a
breach of trust, beneficiaries will have no
effective remedy-because the PTC will have no
substantial assets.
They may have a claim
against the directors, but if the directors are
family members, this may lead to a civil war in

the family.
In some situations, professional trustees encourage their
clients to establish private trust companies because the intended
operations of the trust are such that the professional trustee is
reluctant to assume responsibility-perhaps the plan is for the
trust to control an active trading or manufacturing business. The
professional trustee thinks it would be safer if its involvement
were as an administrator of the PTC, rather than as the trustee of
the trust. This is true-up to a point. If the professional
institution assists in something that it knows or suspects to be a
breach of trust, it will still be liable as a constructive trustee.
F. A Shared Company
The property is held and administered by a company in
which the trust holds shares which carry a substantial financial
interest but little or no voting rights; the settlor holds the other
shares which carry full voting rights. Hence, the settlor has
control, and he has it outside the trust structure.
As the
controlling shareholder, he has no fiduciary obligation to the
beneficiaries, though the directors have their usual fiduciary
obligations to the company. In many cases this is the best
solution for the settlor who really does want hands-on control of
operations. The main questions for consideration are:
(1)

The succession question: Who is to take the
controlling interest in the shared company when
the settlor dies or becomes incompetent, and
how is this transfer of control to be achieved?

There are several techniques for putting control
into the desired hands, including multiple
classes of shares which take voting control
successively, the use of guarantee companies, or
the use of non-charitable purpose trusts to hold
the voting shares and ensure that the right
people are appointed as directors of the share
company.
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(2)

(3)

The remedy question: If the person or persons
with the controlling interest in the company act
in a manner contrary to the interests of the
beneficiaries, they will probably have no effective
remedy. This may be of concern to the settlor if
his plan is that someone else, other than the
trustee, is to step into his shoes as the
controlling shareholder.
The incentive question: If it is the settlor's plan

that someone else will step into his shoes as
controlling shareholder, there may need to be
some financial incentive.
G. A Company Without a Trust
A trust is not the only legal mechanism for creating
successive interests. A company can be used instead. One
simple technique is to have the shares held in joint names so that
Another
on the settlor's death they pass by survivorship.
special
rights
with
of
shares
several
classes
is
to
have
technique
that subsist only during the first holder's lifetime. For those
whose plans are fairly simple, this may be a good solution-if
there are no tax objections. There are lots of variations on this
theme, especially in those offshore centers which have the
concept of a company limited by guarantee, as distinct from a
company limited by shares. The virtue of a guarantee company is
that a person's membership can simply expire on his death (or
other specified events); there is no share to fall into his estate.
The main limit on all corporate solutions is the fact that a person
cannot be admitted to membership of the company and so cannot
be given enforceable rights, if he is not yet in existence and
ascertained. Whatever the constitution of the company may say
about admitting such persons to membership in due course, the
current members may decide to change the constitution.
H. Purpose Trust
Much of the difficulty in accommodating retentive settlors
turns around the point that, in an ordinary trust, the trust
property must be managed in the interests of the beneficiaries.
The purpose of the trust is necessarily to benefit the beneficiaries.

It is not easy to reconcile that necessary purpose with the
settlor's desire for control unless it is an agreeable solution for all
concerned that the settlor assume fiduciary obligations and
disabilities. If that is not agreeable, care is needed. Purpose
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trusts offer a radical alternative solution.8 4 The point is that the
purpose of the trust need not be necessarily and simply to benefit

the beneficiaries, so the door is opened to all sorts of interesting
possibilities.
While some of us have devoted considerable efforts to finding
effective control mechanisms, some have simply ignored the
paperwork and the legal niceties. In the Jersey case of Abdel
Rahman v. Chase Bank,8 5 the only defect in the paperwork (on
which no Jersey lawyer had been asked to advise) was that it
offended a particular Jersey rule, now abolished, known as
donner et retenir ne vaut.8 6 On that ground the trust was struck
down. Additionally, however, it appeared that both the trustee
and the settlor had continued to behave as though the settlor
remained the sole beneficial owner of the trust property. The
catalogue of errors makes grim reading. Not surprisingly, the
Jersey court decided that the trust was a sham. This certainly
caught the attention of professional trustees in all the offshore
centers, and has had a salutary effect in tightening up their
practices. Indeed, I believe there has in some quarters been an
over reaction, probably because there is, or was, fairly widespread
confusion about what "sham" really means. A good many learned
articles have been written and conference presentations made, on
this subject; and I am optimistic that the confusion is abating.
Some offshore centers have enacted legislation intended to
remove or reduce the risk that a trust may be held invalid if the
settlor reserves excessive powers or interests. The Cook Islands
International Trusts Act 1984 provided a long list of powers and
declared that no international trust or disposition would be void
on their account.8 7 So far as English principles are concerned, it
may be doubted whether such provisions really address the
problem. The reservation of powers, dispositive or administrative,
is not of itself hazardous to the validity of a trust, except that
validity may be in question if the settlor reserves to himself
exclusive power to make management and investment decisions
and makes it clear that he accepts no fiduciary obligations in that
respect. Be that as it may, similar rules have been adopted by
Nevis and the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands' Trusts
(Amendment) (Immediate Effect and Reserved Powers) Law 1998
does also address a related but different problem, where the
drafting of a trust instrument leads to doubt whether, quite apart
from all the settlor's reserved powers, there is an immediate trust
84.
85.
86.
87.

For a discussion of such trusts, see infra Section XIII.
[19911 J.L.R. 103.
See Part VI.B.
See International Trusts Act 1984 (Cook Islands), reprinted in 1
INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAws, supranote 5, at D8-3.
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for the benefit of anyone other than the settlor himself. Not
infrequently, the drafting of trust instruments is less clear in this
respect than it should be. The Cayman legislation establishes a
rebuttable presumption that an immediate trust was intended.

VIII. INVESTMENT
Trustee investment rules vary in detail among the offshore
centers, but in most of them the basic principles are those
developed by the English courts. In England, the leading case
was heard a little more than one hundred years ago, and
considering the radical changes that have taken place since then,
the principles have held up remarkably well. 88 One might say the
same of Justice Putnam's even more antique statement.8 9
Nonetheless, the principles or their application have fallen behind
economic and market developments. In the offshore context, the
old principles suffer some additional deficiencies. In particular:
(1)

(2)

(3)

88.
89.

Frequently, the "new client" does not regard the
preservation of capital as the paramount
He wants a more aggressive
objective.
investment policy.
The requirement of care and skill, that of "the
ordinary prudent man of business," makes even
less sense in an offshore context. In which
region of the world should one seek the
hypothetical man of business? Even if one went
to the most sophisticated region, one would
hardly expect to find an ordinary man of
business who was competent to run a large
The
international portfolio of investments.
principle against delegation is diametrically
opposed to the requirement of prudence.
Dealing with markets around the globe,
delegation is essential.
is
capital
to
preserve
The
admonition
meaningless without an agreed base currency or
some other yardstick to measure value. Indeed,
no investment strategy can sensibly be devised
without knowing how to measure success or
failure. In an onshore trust, the yardstick will
generally be the domestic currency, even if the

Learoyd v. Whiteley, (1897) 12 App. Cas. 727.
Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. (26 Mass.) 446 (1831).
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trust is intended to have foreign investments. In
an offshore trust it is most unlikely that anyone
would consider the domestic currency to be the
appropriate yardstick. The old rules provide no
answer. If the beneficiaries live in one country,
it may be argued that the currency of that
country is the relevant yardstick-because that
is where the beneficiaries are most likely to use
the trust distributions. But in many cases, this
would run directly counter to the settlor's actual
intentions; many settlors see their trusts as a
way of protecting themselves and their families
from the uncertainties of their own countries'
economies.
If obliged to specify a single
currency as the yardstick, most settlors would
probably choose the U.S. dollar-but only
because of current economic conditions. Even in
the short term one can foresee the Euro
becoming an alternative choice. My impression
is that most settlors, taxed with this question,
prefer not to tie their trust to any single
yardstick. So how is one to measure success?
On the other hand, the English principles have the
redeeming feature that the trust instrument is competent to
establish its own investment regime. It would be nice now to
report that offshore trusts do establish satisfactory investment
regimes, but this would not be entirely accurate. The practice
does seem to be improving, but slowly. One still finds plenty of
trust instruments which do little more in this respect than
provide a long catalogue of investments and transactions upon
which the trustee is authorized to embark.
Surprisingly, perhaps, there seems to be no interesting
offshore legislation on this subject. Many centers are still
operating on the basis of a "legal list" of authorized investmentsrendered irrelevant by almost every trust instrument. As far as I
know, no center has followed the Prudent Investor Rule adopted
by the American Restatement (Third) of Trusts 90 or the proposals
of law reform bodies in the other major trust jurisdictions.
Perhaps there would be more offshore interest in the law
concerning trustee investment, and in the investment provisions
of trust instruments, if more offshore trustees were sued for
failing to discharge their investment duties; but there has been
surprisingly little litigation of that sort. Part of the explanation
90.
(1992).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Prudent Investor Rule)

§§ 227-29
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may be that in many offshore trusts it is not the plan that the
trustee have full management responsibility over a portfolio of
investments. If there is to be a portfolio of investments, its
management is often entrusted to one or more investment houses
in onshore centers, though in recent years the offshore
institutions have made headway in winning this business. Often,
as already noted, the settlor himself wishes to make the
decisions, at least with regard to policy. Often the trust is
intended to hold particular investments or property.

IX.

SUPERNUMERARY POWERS

Understandably, the "new client" often has misgivings about
putting substantial assets into an unfamiliar structure
administered by an unfamiliar institution in an unfamiliar land.
Reservation of control by the settlor may be problematic for
extraneous reasons; in any case, the trust is usually meant to
continue for a significant period after the settlor dies or becomes
incapacitated. So it is now usual to find that powers of one sort
or another are given to persons who are neither the settlor nor
the trustee. The labels vary, but "protector" and "management
committee" are both popular. My generic label for these powerholders is "supernumeraries," and I refer to their powers as
"supernumerary powers".
Supernumerary powers vary greatly. Sometimes the supernumerary is peripheral to the trust administration, sometimes he
is so central that the trustee is little more than a custodian.
Among the supernumerary powers that I have encountered are
powers:
(1) to appoint or remove trustees;
(2) to approve the trustee's remuneration;
(3) to approve self-dealing by trustees;
(4) to make or approve investment or administrative
decisions;
(5) to make or approve amendments to the
administrative terms of the trust;
(6) to make or approve distribution decisions;

(7) to make or approve additions to or exclusions
(8)
(9)

from the class of beneficiaries;
to veto the settlor's exercise of reserved powers;
to determine whether the settlor is suffering a
disability or other misfortune such that his
reserved powers should be terminated or
suspended;
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(10) to veto the exercise of beneficiaries' rights, for
example, the 'right to trust accounts
information;
(11) to give or obtain tax advice for the trust;

(12) to undertake regular reviews
administration;

or

of the trust

(13) to nominate auditors;

(14) to approve the trustee's accounts;
(15) to release the trustees from liability for breach of
trust;
(16) to settle questions or disputes concerning the
administration of the trust;
(17) to enforce the trust by legal proceedings;
(18) to change the governing law of the trust;
(19) to trigger or cancel flight arrangements (Castro
clauses);
(20) to terminate the trust by triggering the final
vesting provision.
I should note immediately that in relation to some of these
powers, there is considerable doubt whether the law permits
them. For example, it seems doubtful whether a supernumerary
can be empowered to release the trustee from liability, and if that
is permissible, one suspects that the effect may be to shift the
beneficiary's claim from the trustee to the supernumerary. As for
appointing a supernumerary to settle questions or disputes
concerning the administration of the trust, it is in general
impossible to oust the jurisdiction of the court. Other powers
whose feasibility may be questionable are the power to enforce
the trust by legal proceedings and the power to veto the exercise
of beneficiaries' rights.
The variety in supernumerary powers reflects the variety in
the motives for having a supernumerary. For example, the

motive may be:
(1)

as a precaution against the trustee becoming
unsuitable;
(2) as a precaution against the chosen trust center
becoming unsuitable;
(3) as a reassurance that the trustee will pay due
regard to a non-binding letter of wishes;
(4) as a means of ensuring that someone
knowledgeable about the settlor's family is
involved in making distribution decisions;
(5) as a mechanism for keeping the tax planning of
the trust up to date;
(6) to provide effective liaison between the trustee
and the beneficiaries;
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(7)
(8)

(9)

to enable beneficiaries to participate in some
fashion in the trust administration;
to enable the trust to pursue an investment
policy which the trustee regards as unduly
hazardous or difficult;
to enable the trust to carry out some collateral
purpose of the settlor, "collateral" in the sense
that it is not just a matter of conferring financial
benefit on the beneficiaries;

(10) to provide a fagade behind which the settlor may
exercise control over the trust administration;
(11) to enable the appearance of an offshore trust
with an offshore trustee while the de facto trust
administration is conducted onshore.
Again, there are some unmeritorious items in the list-the
last two mentioned-but, happily, their incidence seems to be
declining.
The real and continuing problem with supernumerary powers
is that they are seldom drafted adequately. The power itself is
usually set out in sufficient detail, as are the conditions and
formalities for its exercise; but there is rarely sufficient indication
of the duties and disabilities that accompany the power. It is, or
was, supposed by many that if the trust instrument were silent,
the protector could do as he pleased. Several cases have helped
to dispel that unfortunate misconception, but we still do not have
an authoritative statement of the rules or principles by which the
duties and disabilities of a supernumerary may be identified.
There has been some legislation, but in my view it is of little
assistance largely because if it says anything at all about duties
and disabilities, it suggests that the same rule applies to all
supernumeraries regardless of the nature of their powers and
regardless of the purposes for which their powers were given to
them. Surely, the first thing that needs to be recognized in
dealing with supernumerary powers is that the consequences
differ from case to case.
One cannot even say that the
consequences of a given power will be the same in every case.
Take the power to appoint and remove trustees, and consider

four cases:
Case 1: The power is given to the income beneficiary,
and his choice is restricted to licensed trust
corporations.
Suppose the evidence indicates that
the settlor gave this power to the beneficiary so that
he could protect his own interests in the trust. One
hopes a court would conclude that the beneficiary
had no duty in relation to the power, though the
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power could not be used for an extraneous purpose,
for example, to find a trustee willing to commit
breaches of trust in the beneficiary's favor.
Case 2: The power is given to a committee of
beneficiaries, and there is no restriction on their
choice.
Suppose the evidence indicates that the
committee was meant to protect the family as a
whole. One hopes a court would conclude that the
power was held in a fiduciary capacity.
Case 3: The power is given to a non-beneficiary
protector. Suppose the evidence indicates that this
was meant to give beneficiaries a cheaper and more
satisfactory remedy than going to court. Again, one

hopes the conclusion is that the power is held in a
fiduciary capacity; in this case it appears that the
supernumerary has a passive role, to react
appropriately if and when a beneficiary suggests that
the trustee should be replaced.
Case 4: The power is given to a professional
protector. Suppose the evidence indicates that the
protector was meant to keep a continuing eye on the
trust administration and to replace the trustee if for
any reason that was in the interests of the
beneficiaries.
In this case one hopes the
supernumerary has a fiduciary duty and must play
an active supervisory role-that is, do what he was
appointed to do.
These few cases illustrate the point that the duties and
disabilities of a supernumerary depend on the circumstances and
are not determined simply by reference to the nature of his
power, or whether he is a beneficiary.
In the Belize Trusts Act 1992, it is provided:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

The terms of a trust may provide for the office of protector of
the trust.
The protector shall have the following powers (a) (unless the terms of the trust shall otherwise provide)
the power to remove a trustee and to appoint a new or
additional trustee;
(b) such further powers as are conferred on the protector by

the terms of the trust or of this Act.
The protector of a trust may also be a settlor, a trustee or a
beneficiary of the trust.
In the exercise of his office, the protector shall not be
accounted or regarded as a trustee.
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Subject to the terms of the trust, in the exercise of his office
a protector shall owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of
the trust or to the purpose for which the trust is created. 9 1

This seems to raise a number of questions. Why should a power
to replace the trustee be implied?
What is meant by the
proposition in paragraph (4) that the protector "shall not be
accounted or regarded as a trustee"? Unless he holds the trust
property, that seems obvious. Why should one presume that the
protector has a fiduciary duty? What does that duty actually
entail: for example, should the protector keep an eye on the trust
administration and act on his own initiative, or should he
intervene only if asked to do so by a beneficiary? What is meant
by a duty "to the purpose for which the trust is created," and who
can enforce such a duty?
In the Bahamas Trustee Act 1998, it is provided:
(1)

(2)

A trust instrument may contain provisions by virtue of which
the exercise by the trustees of any of their powers and
discretions shall be subject to the previous consent of the
settlor or of some other person as protector, and if so
provided in the trust instrument the trustees shall not be
liable for any loss caused by their actions if the previous
consent was given and they acted in good faith.
The trust instrument may confer on the settlor or on any
protector any powers including (without limitation) power to
do any one or more of the following (a) determine the law of which jurisdiction shall be the
proper law of the trust;
(b) change the forum of administration of the trust;
(c) remove trustees;
(d) appoint new or additional trustees;
(e) exclude any beneficiary as a beneficiary of the trust;
(fQ add any person (including the settlor and any private or
charitable trust or foundation) as a beneficiary of the

trust in addition to any existing beneficiary of the trust;
*(g)
(3)

give or withhold consent to specified actions of the
trustee either conditionally or unconditionally; and
(g) release any of the protectors' powers.
A person exercising any one or more of the powers set forth
in paragraphs (a) to (h) of subsection (2) shall not by virtue
only of such exercise be deemed to be a trustee and, unless
otherwise provided in the trust instrument, is not liable to
92
the beneficiaries for the bona fide exercise of the power.

Again, there seem to be a number of questions. What does
paragraph (1) mean in terms of the trustee's liability or

91.
Trusts Act 1992 (Belize), Part 3 § 16, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST
LAWS, supra note 5, at D4-13.
92.
Trust Act 1998 (Bahamas), § 81 reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST
LAWS, supranote 5, at 133-60.
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accountability? Plainly, the trustee cannot properly act without
the prescribed consent-and there was no need for a statutory
provision to say that. The idea seems to be that if the consent
has been given, the trustee's liability or accountability is
diminished to some extent. The trustee is to be liable only if it
did not act in good faith. So does this mean that the trustee is
exonerated from its duty to act with care or skill? It seems to
elevate a simple consent provision in a trust instrument to
something more; care may be needed to ensure there are no
unexpected tax consequences. Paragraph (2) has the merit that it
does not seek to imply any powers. Paragraph (3) seems similar
to the Belize provisions, stating that the protector is not a trustee
but implying a duty of good faith. So I have the same questions
or criticisms as for the Belize provisions. Furthermore, in a
matter for which the protector's consent is required and given,
the net effect appears to be that no one, neither the trustee nor
the protector, has any duty of care or skill.
A further general criticism of this and other offshore
legislation on the subject of protectors is that it all tends to
distract attention from the true path, the first step of which is or
should be an inquiry into the purpose for which the particular
power was granted (or reserved) in the particular case. It is that
step which allows one to apply the "fraud on the power" doctrine
and determine whether the power has been exercised for an
improper purpose; it is that same first step which leads one
towards discovering whether the protector was intended by the
settlor to have a duty of some sort to exercise the power or
consider its exercise. To be more precise, it appears that a
sensible way to approach the duty question is to ask:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

Did the settlor grant the power in order that
some purpose of the settlor should be achieved?
Or was it to enable the protector to serve his own
interests or purposes?
If to serve a purpose of the settlor, what did the
settlor expect the protector to do for that
purpose?
To what extent, if any, did the settlor mean this
to be a matter of obligation enforceable by the
court?
Is it the kind of obligation which the court is
willing and able to enforce?

I must admit that there is to my knowledge no case in which
a court has put this forward in so many words as the proper
approach, but it does seem to be consistent with the reported
decisions. Several of these concern offshore trusts; in fact, nearly
all the major offshore trust centers have had at least one
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supernumerary power case.
The main Cayman Islands
contribution was In the Matter of the Z Trust 93 A management
committee was empowered to give the trustee directions
concerning the principal asset of the trust, the shares of a
holding company, which in turn held some valuable minority
positions in family companies. 9 4 Initially, the committee consisted
of the settlor's daughter (who was to become the principal income
95
beneficiary), one other beneficiary and one non-beneficiary.
Eventually, the non-beneficiary was replaced by another
beneficiary. 96 The dispute concerned a power to vary the trust
"with the unanimous written consent of the grantor and the
management committee." 9 7 That power of variation had been
exercised to give the grantor's daughter access to capital in
addition to her income interest. 9 8 Other beneficiaries eventually
claimed that this variation (and the ensuing capital distributions)
was improper. 9 9
The claimants argued that the power of
variation was held, by the committee at least, in a fiduciary
capacity, and so it could not be validly exercised for the benefit of
anyone serving on the committee. l0 0 The court decided as a
matter of construction of that particular trust instrument that the
power of variation was not held in a fiduciary capacity.'10 Even if
it had been, the court decided that this was not a case of a
fiduciary putting herself into a position where her interests
conflicted with her duty; the Grantor had put her into that
position.' 0 2
The decision itself turned, of course, on the
particular facts of the case, but a number of general points
emerge from the judgment of Judge Smellie:
(1)

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

The judge observed, "Much time was taken in
the arguments with the cases which examine the
nature of powers, cases which were all helpful in
their own ways as guidance, but without, as one
might expect, being conclusive ....
The nature
of powers may be as varied as the circumstances

[1997] C.I.L.R. 248, 248-50 (Cayman Is., Grant Ct. 1997).
See id. at 259-60.
See id. at 254.
See id. at 254-55.
Id. at 258-59.
See id. at 254-55.
See id. at 255.
See id. at 259.
See id. at 272.
See id. at 293.
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of the settlements under which they are
103
given."
The committee's power to give investment
directions was admitted by all parties to be
fiduciary, in some sense, but it did not follow
that the Committee's power of variation was
fiduciary.
The judge accepted that a power may be
accompanied by a "qualified fiduciary duty."'04
In this case the committee effectively controlled
not only investment decisions, but also the
dividend policy of the holding company, thus
determining how much of the company's
earnings became trust income to which the
grantor's daughter would then be entitled. She
could hardly have a duty to exercise that control
for the benefit of anyone but herself.

Perhaps the most important points emerging from this case
were, first, that in identifying the duties and disabilities of
supernumeraries, the court is seeking out the intention of the
settlor in granting the power in question. 0 5 It is not an exercise
in finding the appropriate pigeonhole or category of power and
then searching the authorities to find the consequences that go
with that category. Second, the task of identifying the settlor's
intention can be a difficult one if the trust instrument merely
describes the power. 10 6 So the draftsman of a supernumerary
power should take care to indicate, at the least, the purpose for
which the power is granted. It may not be sufficient to say that it
is "fiduciary" or "non-fiduciary," because in some situations
neither epithet answers adequately the questions that need to be
answered.
In these respects, it seems doubtful whether there is much
that the legislator can usefully do-except to avoid giving
confusing signals. However, it would be helpful to have some
statutory guidance on:
(1)

103.
104.
105.
106.

Whether a fiduciary protector has the same
access to the court as a trustee for advice,
direction, protection, and exoneration;

Id. at 256.
Id. at 260-61.
See id. at 257.
See id. at 267-68.
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(2)

(3)
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Whether and in which circumstances the court
has jurisdiction to appoint or remove a fiduciary
protector;
Whether and in which circumstances a protector
has standing to bring an action for the
enforcement of a trust.

X.

CONFIDENTIALITY

It is unfashionable now to talk of confidentiality in polite
terms. The politically correct view seems to be that anyone who
wishes his affairs to be confidential must be a drug-runner or a
money-launderer. However, most settlors and most beneficiaries
are interested in confidentiality, and they cannot all be villains.

Indeed, unless the money has already been well-laundered, it
seems improbable that an intelligent villain would choose a trust,
a structure in which (usually) a government-regulated financial
institution assumes a duty to know what is going on. The fact is
that in most parts of the world, people regard their financial
affairs as private. In some parts of the world, there are special
concerns, for example, fear of kidnapping. None of that has
much to do with the development of trust law and practice
offshore; for us, the interesting confidentiality issues are those
that arise in cases where the settlor does not want his
beneficiaries to have full access to trust information for the time
Many settlors are concerned that their children or
being.
grandchildren should not be discouraged from education and
careers by knowledge of a large trust waiting to line their pockets.
Settlors who are concerned by the risk of a forced heirship attack
may wish to deprive beneficiaries of access to sensitive
information, such as the location of trust assets, until the risk
has disappeared.
English case law does not provide clear guidance in this
respect, but it seems that some trust instruments may go beyond
what is permissible. Thus far, there have been few illuminating
offshore cases. The Cayman Islands case of Lemos v. Coutts,
already mentioned, did confirm that a beneficiary's right to trust
accounts and information is not an absolute right. 10 7 If, as that
case shows, there are circumstances in which the court would
agree that access should be denied or qualified in the interests of
the beneficiaries as a whole, it is presumably legitimate for the

107.

[1992-93] C.I.L.R. at 518; see also infra Part VII.
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trust instrument to confer on a trustee a corresponding
discretion, subject to any contrary direction of the court. Another
Cayman Islands case, Re Ojjeh Trust,10 8 confirmed the application
of the principles laid down by an English court in Butt v.
Kelson,'0 9 qualifying the beneficiary's right of access to
information concerning a controlled company.
The recent Bahamian legislation, the Trustee Act 1998,110
tackles the main issues in a rather lengthy section that may be
summarized as follows:
(1)

(2)

A trustee must take reasonable steps to notify
each beneficiary who has a vested interest. If
there are no such beneficiaries, the trustee must
take reasonable steps to ensure that at least one
person who is capable of enforcing the trust is
aware of its existence and general nature.
The foregoing rules are qualified by the proviso

that no information is to be given if the trustee

(3)

(4)

(5)

in its absolute discretion considers it would not
be in the best interests of the beneficiary to
receive the information.
There are corresponding rules regarding the
disclosure of trust documents and financial
statements.
In disclosing trust documents or financial
statements to a beneficiary the trustee must, if
other beneficiaries so request, or if the trustee
considers it to be in their interests, take all
reasonable
steps
to
exclude
information
concerning the other beneficiaries and their
interests.
Certain categories of documents are put beyond
reach of the beneficiaries. Indeed, they are put
beyond the reach of the court and the discovery
process.
The documents in question are
described as follows:
(a) any memorandum or letter of wishes
issued by the settlor or any other person to
the trustees, or any other document
recording any wishes of the settlor;
(b) any document disclosing any deliberations
of the trustees as to the manner in which
the trustees should exercise any discretion

108.

[1992-93] C.I.L.R. 348, 362-63 (Cayman Is., Grand Ct. 1993).

109.

[19521 Ch. 197.

110.

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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of theirs or disclosing the reasons for any
particular exercise of any such discretion
or the material upon which such reasons

were or might have been based; or
(c)

any other document relating to the exercise
or proposed exercise of any discretion of
advice
(including legal
the trustees
obtained by them in connection with the
exercise by them of any discretion)."'

Item 5 does seem rather radical. If a beneficiary has made a
case that the trustee has exercised a discretion improperly, why
should there not be discovery of the relevant documents? The
thrust of this new rule seems to be to protect the trustee by
reducing its accountability-regardless of whether the settlor
wanted to do so. It is hard to see the justification for this.
Certainly, it has nothing to do with the desire of some settlors to
restrict or delay beneficiaries' access to trust information.
In the Cayman Islands, there has not yet been any statutory
adjustment applicable to ordinary trusts, but the new STAR
regime does allow a settlor to create a trust for beneficiaries on
terms which give them as much or as little (or no) access to trust
information and documents as the settlor wants.1 1 2 Every STAR
trust must have at least one effective enforcer, but nonbeneficiaries can be appointed as the enforcers. In practice, it is
unlikely that a settlor would want to create a trust on terms that
the beneficiaries would never have enforceable rights; but, for
example, the settlor might decide that his children should be
informed of the trust and acquire enforceable rights only when
they had reached a certain age. Meanwhile, of course, someone
else (beneficiary or non-beneficiary) must have rights or duties of
STAR does not affect the rules of discovery
enforcement.
applicable to an action against the trustee.

XI. UNFAMILIARITY

The "new client" tends to be wholly unfamiliar with the trust
concept. That would not be a problem if he came equipped with a
knowledgeable legal adviser. Unfortunately, in many parts of the
world the idea that one should do nothing without legal advice
has not yet taken hold. If the "new client" seeks advice, he does
not necessarily go to a lawyer, let alone a lawyer who knows

111.
112.

See generally Trustee Act 1998 (Bahamas), supranote 92.
See infra Section XIII.C.
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about trusts. He is as likely to rely upon his trusted financial
adviser. Professional trustees recognize the danger of this. If they
cannot steer the client into the hands of a suitable lawyer, they
may try to steer him towards one of their own standard
documents. Many professional trustees have developed several
standard documents, nicely packaged with explanatory materials,
instruction sheets, "due diligence" forms, and the like-all

designed to make trust creation as simple as possible. These
packages are useful not only for dealing with the inadequately
advised client but also for marketing purposes-marketing
personnel not always knowing as much about trusts as perhaps
they should. This packaging practice is good in some respects,
but it tends to an attitude that estate planning is a matter of
choosing between financial products. Of course, plenty of trusts
are properly planned, tailored to the particular client's needs and
circumstances, but plenty are not. On the bright side, this
practice has led to some commendably short and understandable
documents, though occasionally treading perilously close to the
line between trust and agency. Sometimes the explanatory
material in the package is less commendable, suggesting that in
its drafting the marketing personnel gained the upper hand over
the technicians.
XII. ASSET PROTECTION
In the early 1980s, a client of a different kind began to
appear in offshore trust centers-the American professional or
businessman looking for a more effective way of protecting
himself and his family from creditors. The virtues of an offshore
trust for this purpose were being advocated strongly by several
American law firms. Most of the offshore centers then had rules
inherited or copied from England: bankruptcy rules, applicable

for the most part only to debtors who reside or conduct business
within the jurisdiction and fraudulent conveyance rules,
applicable generally. The fraudulent conveyance rules were
generally those of the Statute of Elizabeth 1571, which provided,
in brief, that all conveyances and dispositions of property made
with the intention of "delaying, hindering or defrauding" creditors
would be "clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of none
effect." 1 13 English cases of some antiquity suggested that the
rule applied to future creditors as well as existing creditors. So,
for example, a settlement might be set aside if made in
contemplation of the settlor entering a hazardous business.

113.

Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz. 1 (1571) (Eng.).
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However, the extent of application of the rule in relation to future
creditors had not been clearly established; it seemed evident that
It would surely be
a line had to be drawn somewhere.
unreasonable to set aside every trust in which it could be
established that the settlor recognised that one advantage of
creating a settlement would be to protect his family from the risk
of his own insolvency, even though on any sensible appreciation
that risk was remote.
Many, but not all, of the offshore centers adopted legislation.
In some cases it seems they were merely trying to clarify the
rules; in other cases they were plainly seeking to attract "asset
protection" business by making it more difficult for creditors to
attack trusts. The Cook Islands' legislation appears to be the
most extreme. For example:
(1)

(2)

(3)

It must be proved "beyond reasonable doubt"
that the principal intent of the settlement was to
defraud the plaintiff creditor and that the
settlement rendered the settlor insolvent.
There is deemed to be no fraudulent intent if the
settlement was made before the creditor's cause
of action accrued or more than two years after it
accrued.
A foreign judgment will not be enforced if it is
4
inconsistent with these provisions. 11

Dispositions
Law
Islands'
Fraudulent
The
Cayman
represents a more moderate approach. n 5 It draws the bright line
between obligations that "exist" at the time of the settlement and
those that do not "exist" until later. In that respect, the new rule
is more favorable to settlors than the old rule, though, as already
noted, it was unclear to what extent the old rule protected future
creditors. In other respects, the new rule seems to maintain the
status quo; there is no special burden of proof, no time limit
(apart from the six-year limitation period), and no change to the
The
rules regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments.
precise meaning of "exist" in this context has yet to be
established.
From the outset, most financial institutions have been
nervous of asset protection trusts, and rightly so. Their efficacy
is generally in great doubt-not least because an American

114.
See International Trusts Act 1984 § 13B & 13D (Cook Islands) reprinted
in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, D8-3.
115.
See generally Fraudulent Dispositions Law of 1989 (Cayman Islands),
reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at D7.40.

932

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:879

bankruptcy court will presumably deal quite roughly with a
settlement that it considers to be fraudulent of creditors. So
unless the settlement is consistent with the applicable state law,
effective asset protection presumably requires the relocation of
the settlor, the settled property, and the beneficiaries to a place
where American court orders would not be enforced.
Furthermore, a financial institution that assists in this
arrangement or acts as trustee exposes itself to a risk of civil
liability even in the offshore center (if it transpires that the settlor
broke the local rules). Indeed, if the settlor can be brought within
the scope of the local bankruptcy rules-for example, because he
committed an act of bankruptcy in the offshore center-there
may be a question of criminal liability. Assuming that there may
also be a question of criminal liability in the United States, that
may well be an extraditable offence so far as the offshore center is
concerned. Many financial institutions will not take on asset
protection business at all; others require satisfactory legal
opinions in the offshore center and in the United States. The
result seems to be that, while many enquiries are received about
the formation of asset protection trusts, they seldom come to
fruition. I am perplexed by the reports one hears of billions of
dollars salted away by Americans in asset protection trusts. If
true, most of these trusts must be administered by some very
adventurous or ill-informed financial institutions.

XIII. PURPOSE TRUSTS
A. England: The BeneficiaryPrinciple and
the Requirement of Certainty
In England and most other common law jurisdictions, it is
generally accepted that a trust for purposes is void unless the
purposes are charitable. 116 The explanation is that there is no
one to enforce the trust, no one who can bring the trustee before
the court to compel performance. 1 17 In Leahy v. Attorney-General
for New South Wales,1 8 it was said in the Privy Council:
A gift can be made to persons (including a corporation) but it
cannot be made to a purpose or to an object; so, also, a trust may

be created for the benefit of persons as cestuis que trustent but not
for a purpose or object unless the purpose or object be charitable.

116.
117.

See I INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 5, at B4-3.
See id.

118,

[1959] 2 All E.R. 300 (P.C.).
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For a purpose or object cannot sue, but, if it be charitable, the
Attorney-General can sue to enforce it. 1 1 9

This is the "beneficiary principle," and it sounds straightforward
enough, almost obvious, until one reflects that in many purpose
trusts there are beneficiaries, persons intended to benefit.
Consider a trust for the education of the settlor's grandchildren, a
trust to elect A to some public office, a trust to provide
recreational facilities for the employees of a company, a trust to
improve the treatment of a particular disease, or a trust to expose
immorality in government. In all these examples, the trust is
presumably intended to benefit persons, though not by giving
them cash or property.
So why does the law deny the
beneficiaries of a purpose trust the right to bring the trustee
before the court for an order compelling the trustee to perform
the trust? Where exactly is the critical dividing line between
person trusts (valid) and purpose trusts (invalid unless
charitable)? The English cases do not provide a clear answer to
either question, but one commentator has described the critical
dividing line in the following terms:
It must, it is submitted, be a question of construction in every case
whether the trust is for the benefit of a class of individuals, the
specified manner of their enjoyment . . . being secondary; or
whether the specified mode of enjoyment is the essence of the gift,
the indirect benefit to individuals being secondary. If the trust is of
the first kind, it is a valid trust for the benefit of the specified class
who may, if unanimous, terminate the trust and call for the trust
property. If the trust is of the second kind . . . it is an invalid
12 0
'
purpose trust.

Not an easy test to apply!
Underlying this suggested dividing line seems to be a strictly
proprietary conception of the trust, that it is a mechanism for
giving property to others. The beneficiaries of a person trust have
standing to bring the trustee before the court because they are
the beneficial owners of the property; they are enforcing rights
which equity regards as proprietary interests. The beneficiaries
of a purpose trust are not beneficial owners, their intended rights
are not regarded as proprietary interests, so they have no
standing-even though it may be perfectly clear from the trust
instrument that they were meant to have enforceable rights.
This view of the trust is open to debate. At the least it is
subject to exceptions. English courts do recognize and enforce
trusts in several situations where the plaintiff is clearly not the

119. Id. at 307.
120. P.J. Millett Q.C., The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?, 101 L.Q.R.
269, 282 (1985).
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holder of a proprietary interest. One obvious example is the trust
for charitable purposes. There is no pretence that the Crown or
the Attorney-General is the beneficial owner of property devoted
to charity. Another example is the familiar discretionary trust. A
member of the beneficial class has a right of due administration
but no proprietary interest. 12 1 In these situations, the English
trust is therefore a matter of obligation, not property-an
obligation of the trustee that the courts will enforce by
proprietary remedies as well as personal remedies.
One might think that this undermines the beneficiary
principle described above, that the English courts should
recognize and enforce purpose trusts so long as they have
beneficiaries, persons intended to have a right to the benefit of
the trust, regardless of whether the right amounts to a
proprietary interest. Indeed, this view seems to have been taken
in Re Denley's Trust Deed,12 2 where the judge said:
The beneficiary principle ... is confined to purpose or object trusts
which are abstract or impersonal. The objection is not that the
trust is for a purpose or object per se, but that there is no
beneficiary or cestui que trust.... Where, then, the trust, though
expressed as a purpose, is directly or indirectly for the benefit of an
individual or individuals, it seems to me that it is in general outside
the mischief of the beneficiary principle.... I think that there may
be a purpose or object trust, the carrying out of which would
benefit an individual or individuals, where that benefit is so indirect
or intangible or which is otherwise so framed as not to give those
persons any locus standi to apply to the court to enforce the trust,
in which case the beneficiary principle would, as it seems to me,
apply to invalidate the trust, quite apart from any question of
123
uncertainty or perpetuity.
12 4
However, this view has received criticism as well as support.
So the English situation is uncertain. The beneficiary principle is
undoubtedly a feature of English law, but its extent is unclear. It
certainly strikes down trusts for impersonal purposes, though
exceptions have been made, for example, for trusts to maintain
animals and graves. 125 It also strikes down trusts for abstract
purposes-where the benefit to persons is too indirect (for
example, a trust to develop a better alphabet)-unless charitable.

121. See UNDERHILL & HAYTON, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 40 (15th ed.
1995).
122. [1968] 3 All E.R. 65 (Ch.).
123. Id. at 69.
124. See e.g. Re Lipinski's Will Trusts, [1977] 1 All E.R. 33 (Ch. D.); Re
Northern Developments Holdings Ltd., (Oct. 6, 1978 (Ch. D.), unreported but
described in Carreras Rothmans v. Freeman Mathews, [1985] 1 All E.R. 155, 16667); Re Grant's Will Trusts, [1979] 3 All E.R. 359 (Ch. D.).
125. For a list of such cases, see Astor's Settlement Trusts, [19521 1 All E.R.
1067 (Ch. D.).
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Beyond that, the application of the beneficiary principle is
debatable. If the trust is to benefit persons in some indirect
manner, but it is uncertain which persons may benefit, the trust
is definitely bad (unless charitable); however, it is not clear
whether this is a consequence of the beneficiary principle or the
well-known requirement that the objects of a trust must be
certain. Indeed, the requirement of certainty is, under English
principles, another major obstacle to the creation of purpose
trusts.
Under English principles, a trust must be expressed in such
a way that (1) whatever the trustee may do with the property, the
court will be able to say with certainty whether this was proper or
improper, and (2) the court itself can, if need be, execute the
trust. 126 Under the first limb of this rule, any conceptual
uncertainty in the purpose will be fatal to the trust. For example,
a trust for the education of persons of a given description will
presumably fail (unless charitable) because the word "education"
is conceptually uncertain--does it, for example, include technical
training or visits abroad to improve one's fluency in a foreign
language-and it will fail doubly if the description of the
beneficial class is such that one cannot say of every postulant
whether he is within it. As for the second limb of the rule, the

important point is that the court is unwilling to decide nonjusticiable questions.' 2 7 The extent of non-justiciability is in
some doubt following McPhail v. Doulton,128 but it seems safe to
say that if the trust is so framed that, though the bounds of the
trustee's discretion are well marked, the decision will involve an
arbitrary choice, or one based on personal preference, the trust
will fail the test and be void. There must be a criterion, expressed
or implied, to guide the exercise of discretion.
Again, an
exception is made for charity; in charity cases, the court will
settle a scheme of administration.
To satisfy this certainty requirement, the draftsman of a noncharitable purpose trust must take the greatest care.
Though for these reasons it is, to say the least, difficult to
create a non-charitable purpose trust under English law, England
is a party to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Trusts and on Their Recognition, and the Convention has been
incorporated into English law by the Recognition of Trusts Act
1987.129 The Convention's definition of a trust includes trusts for

126.

See generally Morice v. The Bishop of Durham [1803-13] All E.R. 451

(1805).
127.
128.
129.

See UNDERHILL & HAYTON, supranote 121, at 73.
[1970] 2 All E.R. 228, 247.
See 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at Al-S.
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purposes, and there is no suggestion that these purposes need be
charitable. 130 Indeed, such a condition would be problematic
since the concept of charity varies from one jurisdiction to
another. In consequence, an English court is bound to recognize
a foreign non-charitable purpose trust unless one of the specific
Convention exceptions applies-for example, the particular trust
is "manifestly
incompatible" with English public policy (ordre
1
13

public).

It has been suggested by one English commentator that any
non-charitable purpose trust is offensive to English public policy
32
because the beneficiary principle is a matter of public policy.'
If so, England is at liberty, despite the Convention, to withhold
recognition of foreign purpose trusts unless they conform to the
English idea of charity.
However, I find it very difficult to
imagine an English court taking such a chauvinistic view of an
international agreement whose obvious purpose is to require all
participating countries to recognize foreign trusts even though
they could not be created under domestic law. Furthermore, in
the various English cases dealing with attempts to create English
trusts for non-charitable purposes, there is nothing to suggest
that the idea is in any way harmful to the public weal. Such
attempts have failed for the technical reason that there would be
no one to enforce the trust. It may be noted that there is no
English objection to the creation of a company to carry out noncharitable purposes. So if the foreign jurisdiction has solved the

technical problem by providing an enforcement mechanism, I
cannot see why an English court should find the idea in the least
bit offensive.
It should be added that there are plenty of countries that
have not ratified the Convention. To what extent they would
recognize non-charitable purpose trusts is unclear but, of course,
many of them are no-trust countries that give limited recognition
to any kind of trust, whether for persons or for purposes.
B. Offshore Legislation

In recent years, most of the offshore centers have enacted
legislation enabling the creation of non-charitable purpose
trusts. 133

Nauru was the first in the field in 1972, but the idea

did not really take off until Bermuda's legislation in 1989, which

130.
See The Hague Convention, art. 2, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST
LAWS, supranote 5, at D51-1.
131.
See UNDERHILL&HAYTON, supra note 121, art. 11.
132.
See Paul Matthews, Star: Big Bang or Red Dwarf? 12 TOLLEY'S TRUST
LAW INTL 98, 99 (1998).
133.
See 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at A24-14.
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has been the model for several of the other offshore centers. 13 4
Not all have followed Bermuda. Belize and Jersey, for example,
have gone their own ways.
To confuse the picture further,
Bermuda has recently modified its legislation-time will tell
whether other Bermuda-style centers follow suit.
Though this legislation varies in style and substance, the

fundamentals are similar.

The enforceability problem that

underlies the beneficiary principle is overcome by saying that a
non-charitable purpose trust can be enforced at the suit of
anyone who has been appointed as an enforcer by or pursuant to
the trust instrument; settlors have a free hand in choosing whom
they will appoint as enforcers.
The other major stumbling block, the English requirement
that the objects of a trust be certain, has received surprisingly
little attention. In some cases the legislation says nothing at all
on this subject; in some it is provided that the purposes must be
"specific, reasonable and possible"13 S or "certain, reasonable and
possible;" under Bermuda's recent modification, the purposes
must be "sufficiently certain to allow the trust to be carried
out."13 6 To what extent these various formulations depart from
the English rule is presently unclear. It will be interesting to see
what the courts decide.
Another common feature of all this offshore legislation is that
it grafts the new rules for non-charitable purpose trusts onto the
existing body of trust law, leaving unaltered the old rules
regarding person trusts and charitable purpose trusts. The snag
with this approach is that the distinction between person trusts
and purpose trusts remains critical-and obscure, as noted
earlier.' 3 7 One set of rules governs person trusts, different rules
govern charitable purpose trusts (as in England), and a third set
of rules governs non-charitable purpose trusts.
So when a
question arises concerning, for example, the validity of the trust,
the question of who has standing to enforce the trust, the
question of whether those who would benefit from the trust have
any enforceable rights, or the question of whether the court has

jurisdiction to effect or approve a variation of trust, there is a

134.
See Foreign Trusts, Estates and Wills Act 1972 (Rep. Of Nauru),
reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 5, at D26-1 1; Trusts (Special
Provisions) Act 1989 (Bermuda), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra
note 5, at D5-28.
135.
See e.g. Trusts (Special Provisions) Act, 1980 (Bermuda) § (1)(a),
reprintedin 1 LEWis D. SOLOMAN & LEWIS J. SARET, ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES:
TAX AND LEGAL ASPECTS, 1999-1 Cumm. Supp. at 416.
136.
Trusts (Special Provisions) Amendment Act 1998 (Bermuda) § 2,
reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 5, at DS-38.

137.

See supranote 120 and accompanying text.
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preliminary question: is this a person trust, a charitable purpose
trust, or a non-charitable purpose trust?
This preliminary
question may very vel be difficult and expensive to resolve. The
situation is likely to be even more difficult if the trust instrument
subjects property to mixed person/purpose trusts.
In some
regimes, it seems the answer to this last point is that you cannot
have a mixed person/purpose trust.
C. Cayman: The Special Trusts (AlternativeRegime) Law, 1997
The Cayman Islands have adopted a different approach. The
Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law (STAR) establishes an
alternative trust regime under which trusts of all kinds can be
created, not just non-charitable purpose trusts.13 8 STAR applies
*3 9
to a trust if, and only if, the trust instrument so provides.
Trusts subject to STAR are referred to in the legislation as
"special trusts,"14° but will be referred to in this paper as STAR
trusts. If the trust instrument does not invoke STAR, it is an
ordinary trust governed by the ordinary trust principles inherited
from England. 141
STAR provides that the law relating to STAR trusts is the
same in every respect as the law relating to ordinary trusts, save
as provided in the legislation.142 The main differences are:
(1)

(2)

Objects: The objects of a STAR trust may be
persons or purposes or both. The purposes may
be charitable or non-charitable.1 43
Enforcement Those persons, if any, who would
derive a benefit or advantage, directly or
indirectly, from the execution of a STAR trust
(defined as "beneficiaries") do not, as such, have
standing to enforce the trust; nor do they have
an enforceable right to the trust property. 14 4 The
only persons who have standing to enforce a
STAR trust are those beneficiaries or nonbeneficiaries who are given the right or duty of

enforcement by the trust instrument. 145 STAR

138.
See Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997 (Cayman Islands),
reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at D7-49.
139.
See id.§ 3.
140.
Id. § 2.
141.
See id. § 3.
142.
See id. § 5.
143.
See id. § 6.
144.
See id. § 7.
145.
See id.
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refers to these persons as "enforcers."' 4 6

(3)

In

certain circumstances, the court may appoint an
47
enforcer.1
Uncertainty: A STAR trust.is not rendered void by
uncertainty as to its objects or mode of
execution.148
The trust instrument may
empower the trustee or others to resolve any
such uncertainty; the court has jurisdiction to
resolve uncertainty by reforming the trust, by
settling a plan for its administration, or in any
49
other way which the court deems appropriate.'
However, if the general intent of the trust cannot
be found from the admissible evidence as a
matter of probability, the court may declare the
50
trust void.'

(4)
(5)

Variation: The court has cy pres jurisdiction to
deal with supervening impossibility, illegality or
5
obsolescence.' '
Perpetuity: The various rules against perpetuities
52
do not apply to STAR trusts.1

(6)

Testamentary delegation: STAR trusts may be

(7)

created inter vivos or by will. The rule against
testamentary delegation does not apply. 15
Trustees: At least one of the trustees must be a
trust company
duly licensed in the Cayman
S4

Islands.'

STAR treats the trust as a matter of obligation, not
property.' 5 5 The obligation is annexed to the trust property in
the sense that (1) it is an obligation to do something with the
trust property, and (2) it is enforceable against the trustee and
third parties by proprietary as well as personal remedies.' 5 6 It is
directly comparable to an English trust for charitable
purposes.' 5 7 The enforcers of a STAR trust perform the same
146.

Id.

147.
148.
149.
150.

See id.
See id. § 10.
See id.
See id.

151.
152.
153.
supra note

154.

Seeid.§ 11.
See 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at A7-29.
See Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997 (Cayman Islands),
138, § 3.

155.

See id. § 12.
See 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 5, at A7-30.

156.
157.

See id.
See id.
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function as the Attorney General in relation to an English
charitable trust. In fact, one might say that STAR takes the
English idea of an obligation trust to its logical conclusion. What
English law permits in limited circumstances, STAR permits in all
circumstances. The Attorney General is retired, and the creator of
the trust can chose whom he pleases to be enforcers. l5 8
The same rules apply whether the STAR trust is for persons
or purposes or both.' 5 9 Indeed the person/purpose distinction
ceases to have any significance. Even if the trust obligation is to
make distributions to persons, and even if the trust instrument
appoints those persons as enforcers, the trust is still a matter of
the trustee's obligation, not the beneficiaries' property. In an
ordinary (English) trust, the beneficiaries can put an end to the
trust under the rule in Saunders v. Vautier-because they are the
beneficial owners. But STAR states expressly that the
160
beneficiaries, as such, have no right to the trust property.
Qua enforcers, they can compel performance of the trust
obligation, but they have no authority to put an end to the trust.
Indeed, even if all the enforcers and the trustee wanted to put an
end to the trust, they could not properly do so. A trustee or
enforcer who acts with the intention of defeating the trust is
guilty of theft. STAR gives an enforcer proprietary remedies to
recover misapplied property from third parties, but it is clearly
stated that these remedies are given to the enforcer on behalf of
the trust.161

Thus, STAR is a mechanism by which obligations of any kind
(if they are lawful and not contrary to public policy) may be
annexed to property. Standing to enforce the trust obligation can
be given to whomever the trust creator chooses, whether or not
beneficially interested.
An English commentator has posed the question whether, if
none of the persons who stand to benefit directly or indirectly
from a STAR trust are appointed as enforcers, an English court
might take the view as regards any English property that the
settlor remains the beneficial owner on the basis of a resulting
trust. 162 Of course, such a situation is highly unlikely. Unless
there are compelling extraneous reasons, such as taxation, the
settlor will surely want the intended beneficiaries to have rights of

158.
159.
160.

See id. at A7-33.
See id.
See Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997 (Cayman Islands),

supranote 138, at § 7.

161.
162.

See id. §9.
See David Hayton, Preface to

ANTONY DUCK'WORTH, STAR TRUSTS: THE
SPECIAL TRUSTS (ALTERNATIVE REGIME) LAW 1997 CAYMAN ISLANDS, 2ND GENERATION
OF PURPOSE TRUSTS AND MORE 1998.
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enforcement sooner or later.
Furthermore, even if the
beneficiaries are excluded from enforcement, the question can be
avoided by holding English assets through an appropriate
offshore holding company-and, of course, most offshore trusts

operate through holding companies in any event. So the question
is somewhat academic, but I find it difficult to see how an English
court could possibly reach the conclusion suggested-unless the
particular trust was for some reason so offensive to English law
or public policy that the court refused to recognize it at all. If the
STAR trust is recognized, and the question is whether its effect is
to leave the settlor as the beneficial owner, the answer is perfectly
obvious-no! One could only regard the settlor as the beneficial
owner on the basis of a resulting trust if the trustee had a duty to
hand over the trust property to him or in accordance with his
directions; STAR makes it quite clear that this is not so. Indeed,
if the trustee did hand back the trust property to the settlor, the
property would be recoverable at the suit of any enforcer; the
trustee would be liable to reinstate the trust fund; any enforcer or
other person involved in the misapplication would also be liable,
if he knew it was a misapplication; and the trustee would be
guilty of theft and punishable accordingly. Hardly the symptoms
of a resulting trustl
So who does have beneficial ownership of property held in a
STAR trust? The answer is exactly the same as in an English
trust for charitable purposes. There is no beneficial owner. The
trustee has the full ownership of the trust property, to the
exclusion of the settlor or anyone else, subject to fiduciary duties
which the court will enforce at the suit of any enforcer. Since
under domestic English principles such a property arrangement
is feasible (a trust for charitable purposes and in certain other
situations), there is no reason to suppose that an English court
would have difficulty in recognizing this as the effect of a STAR
trust.
Compared with the purpose trust regimes of other offshore
centers, STAR has a number of significant features:
(1)

The problem of uncertainty: It has already been
noted that the English requirement of certainty
is an obstacle to the creation of purpose trusts.
STAR deals with this in the same way as the
English rules for charitable trusts-by giving the
163
court jurisdiction to resolve the uncertainty.
Furthermore, STAR allows the trust instrument

163.
See Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997 (Cayman Islands),
supra note 138, § 10.
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to establish its own procedure for resolving
uncertainty without recourse to the court. . 64

(2)

The problem of obsolescence: It is in the nature of
a purpose trust that in time circumstances may
change such that continued adherence to the
terms of the trust would not achieve the settlor's
original intent. There are also the dangers of
supervening impossibility or illegality. Again
STAR solves the problem in the same way as the
English rules for charitable trusts-by giving the
5
court a cy pres jurisdiction.16

(3)

Rights and duties of enforcers: STAR deals

66
comprehensively with the status of enforcers.1
In particular, the settlor has a choice whether to
impose a duty of enforcement. 16 7 If, for example,
he is giving a beneficiary standing to enforce, he
may well decide that the beneficiary should have
a right to enforce but no duty to do so. On the
other hand, if he is appointing a non-beneficiary
to be an enforcer, he will probably want to
impose a duty. If none of the enforcers is a
beneficiary, and none has a duty to enforce, the
trustee must apply to the court for the
appointment of another enforcer. 168 STAR also
provides for the rights of enforcers, but the trust
instrument may add to, or exclude, the statutory
rights. A non-obligatory enforcer is given the
same rights as a beneficiary of an ordinary trust;
an obligatory enforcer is given the same rights
and protections as a trustee.
(4) Powers: STAR deals with powers as well as
trusts.
Given the current vogue for giving
powers to protectors, management committees
and other supernumeraries, it is important for a

purpose
(5)

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

trust regime

to

provide

for

the

enforcement of the associated duties, if any.
Remedies: STAR makes it clear that there are
69
proprietary remedies for breach of trust.
Otherwise, there would be a danger that a
purpose trust might be analyzed, domestically or

See id.
Seeid, § 11.
See id. §§ 7-9.
See id. § 8.
See id. § 7.
See id.
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(6)

abroad, to be an obligation that binds the
trustee but does not encumber the trust
property so as to make it recoverable from an
innocent third party, or to obtain priority over
the trustee's general creditors.
Final disposition: Some purpose trust regimes
limit the duration of a purpose trust and require
that the trust instrument provide for the final
disposition of the property at the end of the
permitted term.
Presumably,
the final
disposition is governed by ordinary trust

principles; the final disponee presumably has

(7)

the same rights as the beneficiary of an ordinary
trust. This complication is avoided by STAR.
STAR trusts are exempted from the rule against
perpetuities. 170 If the settlor chooses to limit the
duration of the trust, his final disposition is
governed by the STAR rules.
Mixed trusts: One of the most important practical
features of the STAR regime is that a trust may
be created which is partly for persons and partly
for purposes. For example, a settlor may put his
trading venture in trust with the objects of (1)
continuing the business in accordance with a
business plan, and (2) distributing dividends
and other proceeds among his family. As has
been noted, some other purpose trust regimes
do not permit mixed trusts; in order to have the
benefit of the purpose trust rules, the trust must
be exclusively for purposes. Some regimes do
permit mixed trusts, but then the trust is
subject to two sets of rules, one set governing
the purpose elements of the trust, the other set
governing the person elements-and, perhaps, a
third set if some of the purposes are charitablethat may lead to confusion and dispute over
matters on which the rules differ. STAR provides
a single set of rules applicable to all parts of a
17 1
mixed trust.

(8)

170.
171.

The Person/Purpose Distinction: As already
noted, other offshore centres that have enacted
purpose trust rules now have three differing sets

See id.§ 9.
See id.
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of rules, one applicable to person trusts, one to
charitable purpose trusts, and one to noncharitable purpose trusts. So when an issue
comes before the court it may be necessary to
what kind of
decide a preliminary question:
trust is this? STAR reduces this preliminary
issue to child's play. Quite simply, the STAR
rules apply if the trust instrument contains a
declaration to that effect. 172

D. Application to Private Trusts
Obviously, STAR is useful for those who want to set up noncharitable purpose trusts-so long as the purposes are lawful and
not contrary to public policy. The STAR legislation makes no
attempt to define the public policy exception. English case law
gives some guidance but settlors should beware, especially if
their trusts might continue for a long time.
Less obviously, STAR offers some additional planning
possibilities for charitable trusts. In particular, the Attorney
General does not have responsibility for STAR trusts even if they
are for charitable purposes. Of course, this will not suit those
who like the idea of official enforcement-and they can obtain
that by using an ordinary Cayman trust for charitable purposes.
Others may feel that they can establish more effective review and
enforcement mechanisms of their own. STAR enables them to do
so. Another advantage is that under STAR there is no need to
wonder about whether the trust qualifies as exclusively
charitable. Under English law, that is critical to the validity of
the trust; the law reports show only too clearly how many pitfalls
there are for the uninformed or unwary. 1 73

Care is needed not

only in drafting the purpose clause but also, for example, in any
provision that creates a power to vary the trust or change the
governing law. STAR provides a primrose path around all these
traps.
Perhaps the most interesting STAR applications, however,
are in relation to person trusts. STAR gives planners a great deal
of additional flexibility. Arrangements that are difficult or
impossible under the ordinary trust regime are made easy by
STAR:

(1) A trust for persons can have purposes, too. As
noted earlier, a settlor may want to put his

172.

See id. § 3.

173.

See DOUGLAS H. MCMULLEN ET AL., TUDOR ON CHARITIES (6TH ED. 1967).
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(2)

(3)

business into a trust on terms which require the
continuance of the business as well as providing
that the family are to take the income generated
by it. Under the ordinary trust regime, this is a
difficult proposition.
According to English
principles the interests of the beneficiaries are
paramount, and they-or the court on their
behalf-may override any directions the settlor
has given about retaining the business. Under
STAR one simply provides that continuance of
the business is one of the objects of the trust.
The beneficiaries cannot override that. To give
another example, suppose that the client holds a
block of shares in a closely held corporation and
wants to put these shares into trust for his
family on terms which ensure that the shares
will be voted in some particular way, perhaps to
keep himself or a specified person on the board
of the corporation. Again this is quite difficult to
achieve under the ordinary trust regime because
the trustee must, and the court will, treat the
interests of the beneficiaries as paramount. It is
easy under STAR.
The settlor's investment objectives can be
expressed as objects of the trust and, if so, they
cannot be overridden. As already noted, in an
ordinary trust the interests of the beneficiaries
are paramount. The court may override the
settlor's investment rules in the interests of the
beneficiaries. If the trustee blindly follows the
investment rules in the trust instrument without
regard to the interests of beneficiaries, it is
probably at risk; it may be argued that the
trustee should have applied to the court for
authority to depart from those rules. In any
case a beneficiary can apply to the court. Under
STAR, the interests of the beneficiaries are not
necessarily paramount-it all depends on what
are the stated objects of the trust.
The beneficiaries do not have to form a certain
class. It is well known that an ordinary trust is
void if its objects (beneficiaries) are uncertain.
So for example, if the settlor gives his trustee a
power or duty to make distributions among the
settlor's "relatives and friends," this fails the
certainty test and is void. But, it would be valid
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under STAR.
STAR is more forgiving to the
draftsman and allows settlors to give wider
discretions.
(4) The beneficiaries, if any, do not necessarily have
enforceable rights. Under the ordinary trust
regime, a beneficiary necessarily has certain core
rights, and these cannot be removed by the trust
instrument. The precise extent of these core
rights is not clearly established, but they
certainly include the right to bring an action
against the trustee for the enforcement of the
trust. Under STAR, it is up to the settlor to say
in the trust instrument whether beneficiaries are
to have the right of enforcement and in what
circumstances.
Another core feature of the
ordinary trust is that beneficiaries have a right
to call on the trustee for an accounting and to
demand access to trust documents and
information. This is not an absolute right, and
moreover, it seems that it may to some extent be
qualified by the trust instrument. But, a trust
provision that purports to deny this right
altogether is likely to be struck down as
repugnant to the trust, or worse still, it may
invalidate the whole trust. STAR makes it plain
that it is up to the settlor to decide what rights
the beneficiaries are to enjoy in this respect and
generally. So, for example, STAR accommodates
the settlor who thinks it would be bad for his
children to know that there is a substantial trust
for their benefit until they are well established in
their careers.
(5) The terms of the trust may provide that a beneficiary loses his rights of enforcement and information in specified circumstances. This STAR feature may be highly significant in cases where the
settlor is concerned that beneficiaries may fall
into the hands of creditors or greedy spouses. It
may also be highly significant in forced heirship
planning:
to prevent an heir putting on his
beneficiary's hat to obtain the trust information
and documents that he needs in order to plan
and execute his attack on the trust. Furthermore, the heir can be prevented from using a
trumped-up (or genuine) charge of bias or mismanagement to obtain an injunction from the
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court inhibiting the trustee's ability to take defensive measures.
(6) The rule in Saunders v. Vautier does not apply.
In an ordinary trust, a provision that
distribution of an interest vested in possession
will be postponed until the beneficiary reaches
an age greater than majority, is generally
ineffectual. The beneficiary can call for his
property.
The same principle means that,
whatever the trust instrument may say, the
beneficiaries can terminate the trust if they are
all of a mind to do so-assuming that all of the
beneficiaries are in existence and sui juris.
Under STAR, even if beneficiaries have been
given unqualified rights of enforcement, they
cannot override the terms of the trust.
(7) Trusts can be protectedfrom costly embroilment in
family disputes. If a substantial part of a family's
wealth is in a trust, it may well form the
battleground for any family dispute; this
sometimes happens even when the dispute is in
reality about something different.
Trust
litigation tends to be particularly timeconsuming and expensive-largely because the
interests of so many people are affected, and
especially when the interests of minors and
unborn persons must be represented. For this
reason alone, a wealthy settlor may wish to
consider limiting the ability of individual
beneficiaries to embroil the trust in major
litigation. Under the ordinary trust regime he
has no effective way of doing so. Under STAR he
can tailor the enforcement provisions as he
pleases. For example, he may provide that an
action can only be commenced by a certain
minimum number of beneficiaries, or he can
establish a committee of beneficiaries or others
to keep an eye on the trust administration and
to decide by majority vote whether or not to take
legal action.
(8) People or institutions who are not beneficiaries
can be given the right or duty to enforce the trust.
Under ordinary trust principles it is doubtful
whether a protector or other supernumerary can
be given standing to bring an action against the
trustee for the enforcement of the trust-unless
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he happens to be a beneficiary. In some cases,
particularly if the beneficiaries are young or
financially unsophisticated, the settlor may want
the protector to act as enforcer, to keep an eye
on the trust administration and take appropriate
action if the trustee has mishandled it. Under
STAR this is easy.
A trust may be perpetual. The rule against
perpetuities does not apply to STAR trusts.
However, this feature needs to be treated with
some care. If it is arguable that the objects of a
trust are contrary to public policy, its duration
may
well
affect
the
court's
decision.
Idiosyncratic objects may be acceptable for a
short period but not a long one.
E. Application in Commercial Situations

On the commercial side, it seems there should be plenty of
applications for a mechanism which allows obligations of all
kinds to be annexed to property-protected by all the tried and
tested remedies, personal and proprietary, that English law has
developed for breach of trust. Some particular applications are
suggested below.
1. Holding Special Purpose Vehicles
It has become common for the shares of special purpose
vehicles (SPVs) to be held in charitable or non-charitable purpose
trusts. In a number of financing and securities situations, a
corporate vehicle is required, but it is inappropriate for one
reason or another that it should be owned by any of the
participants. A structure is required that insures the vehicle will
remain in being and will act in the appropriate manner or, at
least, refrain from acting in an inappropriate manner.
Charitable purpose trusts are a popular solution, but care
must be taken to establish that there is a genuine charitable
intent. In other words, the trust may be attacked as a sham if
charitable distributions are not made. Furthermore, the trustee
must of course act in the interests of charity rather than in the

interests of the parties to the transactions in which the SPV is
involved. So care is needed to make sure that a situation cannot
arise in which the trustee may feel compelled to act in a
disruptive manner. Another feature of the charity solution is that
the Attorney General may intervene on behalf of charity.
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Another popular solution has been the non-charitable
purpose trust. In some cases the object of the trust is simply "to
hold the shares of XYZ Limited." If it is put as simply as that,
there must be an argument that this does not qualify as a
purpose trust. The argument is that the trust instrument must
answer the question, "For what object or purpose is the trust
property held?"--and it is no answer to say, "To hold the
property." The obvious solution seems to be to expand the
purpose clause of the trust to state in appropriate terms that the
shares of XYZ Limited are to be held in order to facilitate the
proposed transactions. However, that may give rise to a further
difficulty because it could then be argued that the trust has
beneficiaries, namely the other parties to the proposed
transactions, and the trust may be categorized as an ordinary
person trust.
The difficulty in that outcome is that the
beneficiaries would then be regarded as the beneficial owners of
the shares of the SPV-which is precisely what they were seeking

to avoid in the first place. So it seems that the draftsman must
tread delicately in order to avoid these two pitfalls.
With a STAR trust, the situation is simpler. The object
clause must set out a real purpose-presumably that of
facilitating the proposed transactions-but there is no difficulty
or danger in a purpose beneficial to persons. STAR encompasses
trusts for persons, purposes, or both. Even if the other parties to
the proposed transaction are made enforcers (which is optional)
they should not be regarded as beneficial owners of the SPV. The
rule in Saunders v. Vautier does not apply, so even if all the
enforcers acted in concert, they could not lay hands on the
shares of the SPV.
They can only compel the trustee to
administer the trust properly-or recover misapplied property for
and on behalf of the trust.
2. Segregation of Corporate Assets
Suppose it is proposed to create several investment funds
within a single corporate vehicle. The difficulty is that all the
assets of the company are available to meet all its creditors. So
investors in one fund take the risk that another fund cannot meet
its liabilities-or that the company incurs liabilities in excess of
its general assets. STAR provides a mechanism by which this risk
can be eliminated. The subscriptions for each fund are held by
the custodian in trust to be invested in accordance with the
investment manager's directions and to be applied in paying or
reimbursing the expenses and liabilities of the company referable
to the fund, including liabilities in respect of the company's
shares of the relevant class.
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Another situation in which segregation may be required is
that of the rent-a-captive. Clients want, in effect, to have their
own captive insurance companies, but the rent-a-captive
structure offers economies of scale and the benefit of the rent-acaptive host's own capital base. Of course the client does not
want its captive's assets to be available to the creditors of other
captives within the same host. In some offshore jurisdictions,
Cayman included, the companies legislation has been modified to
permit "cell" companies for this purpose.
STAR provides an
alternative solution.
Deferred variable annuities are a popular insurance product,
and this may be another situation in which STAR provides the
most effective method of segregation-to ensure that the
investment portfolio attributable to one annuity contract is
insulated from liabilities on other annuity contracts or other
business of the insurer. However, the suitability of the STAR
solution, and the terms of the STAR trust, will depend very much
on the relevant tax laws.
3. Security for Remote Obligations
Suppose that A requires effective reassurance that B will
meet an obligation to C in relation to property, or that B will use
a particular fund to pay C. One way of giving A security for this
remote obligation would be for B to put the property or fund in a
STAR trust with the purpose of discharging B's obligation to C,
and returning the residue to B. A is appointed as one of the
enforcers of the trust. Perhaps A's reason for requiring this
reassurance is that, if B does not perform, A will have to do so, or
will suffer some other loss or disadvantage; or this may be a
Quistclose situation in which A is lending B the money to pay B's
debt to C. It appears that the analysis and effect of a Quistclose
trust are still open to argument under English principles. STAR
provides a mechanism under which the rights of all parties-the
lender, borrower, and borrower's creditors-can be established
without doubt.
4. Security for Non-Pecuniary Obligations in Relation to Property
Suppose that X has agreed with Y to apply property in a
particular way, but Y wants effective reassurance that the
property will be so applied. X could put the property into a STAR
trust-to make the application and return the residue, or
resulting assets, to X. Y would be appointed as an enforcer and
so could ensure due execution of the trust. If the trustee
misapplied the property, Y would have (on behalf of the trust)
personal remedies against the trustee (subject to any exculpatory
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provisions of the trust instrument) and also a proprietary tracing
remedy against X or whomever received the misapplication
(unless a bona fide purchaser). If a third party participated
dishonestly in the misapplication, there would also be a personal
remedy against him on the so-called "constructive trust" basis. So
the STAR trust gives Y several additional remedies that it would
not have under a purely contractual arrangement with X-and it
also secures Y against the risk of X becoming insolvent before the
intended application has been completed.
As I hope these examples show, STAR holds out a number of
interesting bommercial possibilities which deserve investigation.
In fact, it was thought to be such a powerful mechanism with so
many possible applications that it is for the moment restricted by
the rule that at least one of the trustees of a STAR trust must be
a trust company licensed in the Cayman Islands. So in any STAR
structure such an institution must be involved, as custodial at
least. This does not prevent the involvement of others in the
trust administration. Provision is made in STAR to relax this rule
by regulation.

XIV. CONCLUSION
From this highly selective review, I think it will be apparent
that the offshore centers have worked hard to develop both law
and practice to meet prevailing conditions. So far as legislation is
concerned, there has naturally been some tension between
market requirements, actual or perceived, on one hand, and more
sober policy considerations on the other. As I have been involved
in the process, I should leave it to others to say whether the right
balance has been struck. So far as practice is concerned, I hope
the discussion is of interest, but I doubt if there is any single
feature that can be described as original. We apply old ideas in
new situations.

